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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-Abel v. United States-IssuEs

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

Appellant Abel is a native of Russia, a citizen of the U.S.S.R., and a
Colonel in the KGB, an espionage agency of the Soviet Government, who
entered this country illegally in 1948 at an unknown point along the
Canadian border. In May 1957, the FBI learned of appellant's activities '
and began an intensive investigation. In June, the FBI informed the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of appellant's illegal entry
into the United States. Further investigation led to the issuance of a
deportation arrest warrant by the New York INS District Director. On
the morning of June 21, FBI agents, gaining admittance to appellant's
hotel room, questioned him concerning his espionage activities, with a view
toward soliciting his "cooperation." Appellant refused. Thereupon, agents
of the INS, who had been waiting in an adjoining room, entered, arrested
appellant, 2 and, without a search warrant,3 searched the room and in the
process of effecting their arrest seized many articles. After further
interrogation by the FBI, and after hearing and order for deportation at an
alien detention camp in Texas, appellant was indicted for having conspired
to violate the espionage laws of the United States.4 Prior to trial, appellant
moved for the return and suppression of certain evidence obtained by INS
agents as the result of the alleged unlawful search and seizure.3 The
motion was denied,6 the evidence admitted, and appellant convicted
and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. The Court of Appeals for
1. Reino Hayhanen, a compatriot of appellant, informed United States officials
that he (Hayhanen) was an espionage agent for the Soviet Government in the United
States. The FBI learned of appellant's local activities from the information supplied
by Hayhanen and began their investigation immediately.
2. The appellant was arrested for having failed to notify the Attorney General
of his address in the United States as required by the Immigration and Nationality
Act which makes such failure a deportable offense. 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251
(a) (5), 1305 (1952).
3. The INS agents were acting solely under the authority claimed as incident to
a valid arrest pursuant to the deportation arrest warrant. 66 Stat 173, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1103(a), 1252(a) (1952) ; 8 C.F.R. 242.2(a) (1958).
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(c), 794(a), 951 (1952). Appellant states, in the affidavit in
support of his motion to suppress, that interrogation was continued for three weeks
after an order for his deportation had been issued. Record on Appeal From the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, p. 31 (hereinafter cited as Record).
5. Appellant's motion, pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, was premised on the settled rule that items seized in violation of the
fourth amendment may not be admitted in evidence in federal criminal proceedings.
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). See appendix to the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 175 (1947).
6. United States v. Abel, 155 F. Supp. 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1957). For a description
of the articles seized which were admitted in evidence, see note 61 infra.
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the Second Circuit, holding that the seizure of the articles admitted in evidence was not violative of the fourth amendment, affirmed. United States
v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 813 (1958) (No.
263), ordered for reargument,359 U.S. 940 (1959).
Certiorari having been granted, 7 and the case having been once argued,
the United States Supreme Court has enumerated the issues to be discussed
on reargument for the October 1959 term.8 It is the purpose of this comment to discuss the merits of the constitutional questions involved. Appellant's conviction may not be sustained unless the seizure of articles admitted
into evidence over objection at his trial can be legitimated as incident to an
arrest which is (1) itself constitutionally valid, and (2) of such a nature
as to support as "reasonable" a search and seizure without warrant in
connection with it, nor unless, moreover, (3) the articles so seized are
within the scope of search and seizure authority derivable from that arrest.9
CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF DEPORTATION ARREST WARRANTS

The Immigration and Nationality Act makes illegal entry into the
United States,'0 failure to register as an alien," or failure to give written
7. "Petition for writ of certiorari . . . granted limited to questions 1 and 2
as follows: '1. Whether the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States are violated by a search and the seizure of evidence
....

without a search warrant, after an alien suspected and officially accused of espionage
has been taken into custody for deportation, pursuant to an administrative Immigration Service warrant, but has not been arrested for the commission of a crime?
'2. Whether the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States are violated when articles so seized are unrelated to the Immigration Service
warrant and, together with other articles obtained from such leads, are introduced
as evidence in a prosecution for espionage?"' 358 U.S. at 813.
8. "1. Whether under the laws and Constitution of the United States (a) the
administrative warrant of the New York Acting District Director of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service was validly issued, (b) such administrative warrant constituted a valid basis for arresting petitioner or taking him into custody, and (c)
such warrant furnished a valid basis for the searches and seizures affecting his person,
luggage, and the room occupied by him at the Hotel Latham.
"2. Whether, independently of such administrative warrant, petitioner's arrest,
and the searches and seizures affecting his person, luggage, and the room occupied
by him at the Hotel Latham, were valid under the laws and Constitution of the
United States.
"3. Whether on the record before us the issues involved in Questions '1(a),'
'1(b),' and '2' are properly before the Court." 359 U.S. at 940.
9. That conviction may not be sustained upon a trial at which evidence seized in
violation of defendant's fourth amendment guarantees has been admitted over appropriate objection, see note 6 supra. The balance of this comment considers the various
grounds upon which the INS search without warrant in the instant case might
arguably be legitimated under the fourth amendment
See also note 8 supra, for
indication by the Supreme Court of some of the issues involved in that determination.
Abel, petitioner before the Supreme Court, will be referred to as appellant, his status
in the proceeding before the circuit court.
10. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241, 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251
(1952) (hereinafter referred to as Immigration Act and by act section number):
"(a) Any alien in the United States . . . shall, upon the order of the Attorney
General, be deported who . . . (2) entered the United States . . . at any time
or place other than as desiguated by the Attorney General or is in the United States
in violation of this chapter . .. ."
11. Ibid. The Immigration Act § 262 requires alien registration within 30 days
after arrival in the country.
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notice of residence to the Attorney General 12 deportable offenses." "At
the commencement of any proceeding 14 . . . the respondent may be
arrested . . . under the authority of a warrant of arrest issued by a
district director whenever, in his discretion, it appears that the arrest of
the respondent is necessary or desirable." 11 Appellant, suspected of having
illegally entered the United States and charged with failure to register his
address, was arrested and taken into custody upon the issuance of such a
warrant.16 The constitutionality of deportation arrest procedures has never
been specifically determined. It has, however, been recently declared by
the Supreme Court 17 that "the power to expel aliens, being essentially a
power of the political branches of government, the legislative and executive,
may be exercised entirely through executive officers with such opportunity
for judicial review of their action as Congress may see fit to authorize or
permit." ' 8 In the exercise of that power, executive officers may be given
authority to issue and execute warrants of arrest. 19 It is clear, therefore,
that Congress need not in this situation provide for judicially administered
warrants. Nor, consequently, need an alien arrestee be brought before a
judicial officer.20 The fact that "probable cause" 2' is not required for the
issuance of a deportation arrest warrant 2 would not seem a bar to
constitutionality. Deportation is a civil,m administrative2 action, the
12. Immigration Act §265. Section 241 makes failure "to comply with the
provisions of section 265" a deportable offense.
13. Immigration Act §241. This section also enumerates those "classes" of
aliens who shall be subject to deportation.
14. Immigration Act §242 describes the procedures required for apprehension
and deportation, including arrest, custody and judicial review. It is provided, inter
alia, that: "(a) pending a determination of deportability in the case of any alien, . . .
such alien may, upon warrant of the Attorney General, be arrested and taken into
custody . . . [and] may, in the discretion of the Attorney General and pending
such final determination of deportability, (1) be continued in custody; or (2) be
released under bond. . . .; or (3) be released on conditioned parole." Section 242
likewise prescribes required procedures for hearing, final order of deportation, detention and supervision.
15. See 8 C.F.R. § 2422(a) (1958).
16. Instant case at 491. See Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing,
Record, p. 34.
17. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
18. Id. at 532-33. See also The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
19. See, e.g., Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896).
20. It should be noted that the federal requirement that an arrestee be taken
before a United States Commissioner without unnecessary delay (FED. R. Cam. P. 5)
is applicable only to criminal process, while deportation procedure has been held civil
in nature. See notes 23-25 infra. Note also that the protections afforded by such
procedures are supported by the exclusionary rule in the federal courts as an exercise
of the federal judiciary power to prescribe rules of procedure for law enforcement,
rather than as a matter of constitutional due process. See, e.g., Upshaw v. United
States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
21. U.S. CoxsT. amend. IV: "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause
22. See notes 14, 15 mtpra and accompanying text
23. This is the universal characterization. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) and Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), for two recent
examples.
24. See, e.g., Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939) ; Wong Mon Lun v. Nagle,
39 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1930).
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results of which are not considered criminal punishment, 25 and many of the
constitutional guarantees afforded criminal defendants by the Bill of Rights
have been held inapplicable to such proceedings.2 The fourth amendment
declaration that no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause,27 a
requirement not so inherent in the fundamental principles of due process
as to be applicable to state arrests for crimes,28 should likewise be inapplicable to the arrest of aliens for deportation.
More determinative perhaps, of the constitutional validity of deportation arrest under the prescribed procedures 2 is the fact that the courts,
when dealing with alien deportation, have specifically upheld denial of
many of the Constitution's safeguards applicable to criminal proceedings.
Aliens may be subjected to double jeopardy, 30 ex post facto laws,3 ' and
denied trial by jury.P2 Moreover, the discretion of the Attorney General
to detain an arrestee without bail has recently been upheld tm and, while
procedural due process requires that a fair hearing be afforded 3 4 and that
an order for deportation must be supported by evidence,3 5 strict adherence
to formal judicial procedure is not required 30 In view of these determinations, it would seem that the procedures by which a deportation arrest
warrant is issued and executed constitute no greater denial to an alien of
the safeguards afforded citizens in criminal proceedings than those which
have heretofore been held inapplicable.
DEPORTATION ARREST WARRANT AS A VALID BASIS FOR SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES BY IMMIGRATION AUTHORITIES

Upon and pursuant to arrest by officers of the INS under a warrant
for deportation, appellant's person and room were searched for weapons
and evidence of alienage. Among the articles seized were birth and vaccina25. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952); United

States ex rel. Circella v. Sahli, 216 F2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954).
26. See notes 30-36 infra.
27. See note 21 supra.
28. The fourth amendment is not applicable to the states. See, e.g., National
Safe Deposit Co. v. Illinois, 232 U.S. 58 (1914) ; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172
(1899); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 153, 157 (1833).
29. See notes 14, 15 supra.
30. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 144 F2d 927 (9th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other
grouids, 326 U.S. 135 (1945); Sire v. Berkshire, 185 Fed. 967 (D.C. Tex. 1911);
Ladaux v. Berkshire, 185 Fed. 971 (D.C. Tex. 1911).
31. Ibid. See United States ex rel. Feuer v. Day, 42 F2d 127 (2d Cir. 1930);
Evans v. Murff, 135 F. Supp. 907 (D.C. Md. 1955).
32. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955); Carlson v. Landon, 342
U.S. 524, 527 (1952).

33. Carlson v. Landon, note 32 supra.
34. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) ; Kessler v. Strecker, 307
U.S. 22 (1939) ; United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924).

35. Ibid.
36. See, e.g., Murdbch v. Clark, 53 F2d 155 (1st Cir. 1931); Weinbrand v.
Prentis, 4 F2d 778 (6th Cir. 1925).
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tion certificates and a bank book, all of which displayed various aliases of
appellant.
A search without a search warrant may be made consistently with the
fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
when the search is incident to lawful arrest for a crime.37 Such a search
may extend beyond the person of the arrestee to include the premises under
his immediate control.38 The purpose, scope, and manner of searches
made incident to a lawful arrest, however, are subject to the requirement
of being not "unreasonable" within the context of the fourth amendment.39
In the final analysis, what is a reasonable search or seizure is always a
judicial question and is resolved according to the facts of each case.40 There
is dearth of authority as to the reasonableness of a search made incident to
an arrest upon deportation charges. 4 1 The general doctrine is that without
42
a search warrant, search and seizure incident to civil arrest is unlawful.
The characterization of deportation proceedings as civil rather than
criminal, 43 lends support to the proposition that any search without warrant incident to a deportation arrest is "unreasonable" and violative of the
fourth amendment. However, since an arrest for deportation by an INS
officer is, in character and function, unlike the typical private civil arrest,
the few decisions which have considered the issue give a contrary indication.
The Third Circuit, apparently the only appellate court to have considered
the power of INS agents to conduct a search as incident to a lawful arrest
in connection with deportation proceedings, 44 in two per curiam decisions
37. Such a search is not per se unreasonable or unlawful. Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) ; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344
(1931).
38. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) ; Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925).
39. The fourth amendment reads as follows: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, and papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or things to be seized" See note 74 infra.
40. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), 36 CORNEmL L.Q. 125-31 (1950), 49 Mica. L. REv. 128-30
(1950).
41. "Both sides have stated that there are no decisions directly on this point, nor
has the court been able to discover one, and thus it is a matter of first impression."
United States v. Abel, 155 F. Supp. 8, 10 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
42. Robinson v. Richardson, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 454 (1859) cited with approval
in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 629 (1886). During the course of its opinion,
the Massachusetts court pointed out that "search warrants were never recognized by
the common law as processes which might be availed of by individuals in the course
of civil proceedings, or for the maintenance of any mere private right; but their use
was confined to cases of public prosecutions, instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime or the detection and punishment of criminals." Id. at 456. A Massachusetts statute was held invalid as authorizing "unreasonable searches and seizures"
because it provided for issuance of warrants to search for property and books of account
of insolvent debtors.
43. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); United States ex rel.
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923). See also notes 23-25 supra.
44. See Diogo v. Holland, 243 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1957) ; DaCruz v. Holland, 241
F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1957).
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has assumed without question that seizures by INS officers incident to
valid arrests were not per se illegal.4 In Taylor v. Fine,41 a district court
stated by way of dictum that "incidental to a legal arrest whether with or
without a warrant, the officers [INS agents] may conduct a reasonable
search," 4 7 but each of the cases which the court cited 48 in support of this
proposition involved a criminal prosecution. Moreover, the case itself involved a criminal arrest.
The fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures 49 should not be applied so as to deny federal authorities, in the
course of making a valid arrest for deportation, opportunity to subject aliens
to searches for documents used as instruments to effectuate illegal entry
or other violations of the immigration laws. In the exercise of its authorized
functions, delegated to the Justice Department by Congress pursuant to
powers conferred by the ConstitutionP it should certainly be within the
power of the immigration authorities to seek out and to gather all the
present implements of those offenses for which an alien is subjected to
deportation. If, as has been submitted, it is within the power of Congress
to provide the arrest procedures to which appellant in the instant case
was subjected,5 1 it should likewise be within the power of the arresting
officers to search incidentally to that arrest without being required to obtain
a judicially issued search warrant. Thus, the fact that issuance and execution of a warrant of arrest for deportation need not comply with the
constitutionally and judicially sanctioned requirements of a criminal arrest
should be determinative of the question whether a search incident to deportation arrest need comply with those same constitutional requirements.
Support for the above analysis is found in the rationale for the general
rule that reasonable searches and seizures may be made without the
safeguard of a search warrant issued upon a finding of probable cause by
a judicial officer if the search is made incident to a lawful arrest for a
crime. 52 The search is justified in order to find and seize, inter alia, objects
connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was
committed,53 and in order to find and seize weapons and other things
45. Ibid.
46. 115 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
47. Id. at 70 n.1.
48. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States,

331 U.S. 145 (1947); United States v. Coffman, 50 F. Supp. 823 (S.D. Cal. 1943);

United States v. Bell, 48 F. Supp. 986 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
49. For detailed history of the fourth amendment see dissenting opinions of
Justices Franldurter and Murphy in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155-98
(1946). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) ; Chafee, The Progress
of the Law, 1919-1922, 35 HAv. L. REv. 673 (1922) ; Fraenkel, Concerning Searches
and Seizures, 34 HAgv. L. RLv. 361 (1921).
50. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
51. See text accompanying notes 10-36 supra.
52. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States,

331 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1947).

53. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
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which could effect an escape from custody. 4 While there is no reasonable
ground to believe that merely because one is an alien he is carrying weapons,
in cases where an alien is suspected or has previously been convicted of a
crime 5 -in the instant case the INS authorities had information that
appellant was an espionage agent of the Soviet Government-protection of
the arresting officers as well as efficient execution of the immigration laws
would seem to require that INS authorities be permitted to seize the means
by which an escape from custody could be effected. Moreover, it can
scarcely be denied that seizure of such articles as forged documents of
identification, tools of those offenses which will support an order for
deportation, is a necessary power if the INS is to efficiently perform its
legitimate function. Finally, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is made pursuant to "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons . . . and effects." 0 Unreasonable seizure of
the person would seem to be the greater evil, and, if it is constitutional to
seize the body of an alien in the manner prescribed by Congress without
resort to traditional due process safeguards, 57 similar seizure of his property,
a lesser evil, should likewise be constitutional, and searches, at least so
long as limited in scope to documents pertaining to alienage or to an
alien's commission of deportable offenses, should be inoffensive to the
fourth amendment's guarantees.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEIZURE BY THE INS OF ARTICLES UNRELATED TO

THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH APPELLANT WAS ARRESTED
In the process of effecting the search incident to appellant's arrest, the
INS agents seized three slips of paper which appellant was attempting to
secret in his sleeve 08 In addition, appellant's suitcase was packed by an
agent, 9 and nearly all his belongings were taken with him to the local INS
headquarters.P One of the slips of paper, containing a cipher, was subsequently admitted into evidence upon appellant's trial for espionage. 01
54. Ibid. Search and seizure incident to lawful arrest has also been justified as
"a practice of ancient origin and . . . long . . . an integral part of the law-enforcement procedures of the United States and of the individual States." Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 151 (1947).
See also opinion of Cardozo, J. in People v.
Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923). It is also explained as making possible
the return of stolen goods to their rightful owner. ALEXANDER, ARREST §§ 132,
139-41 (1949).
55. The Immigration Act § 241 makes conviction of a crime of moral turpitude a
deportable offense.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

57. See text accompanying notes 10-36 supra.
58. Instant case at 492.
59. Record, pp. 65, 68.

60. Id. at 59, 60, 69.
61. Instant case at 492. In all, there were offered in evidence at appellant's trial
two birth certificates, a vaccination certificate, and a bankbook, all bearing various
aliases of appellant and all seized by the INS, a slip of graph paper containing a code
cipher, seized by the INS from the person of appellant, who was trying to conceal
it in his sleeve, and a cipher book and a hollowed pencil containing microfilm, seized
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The instant court held that, since the seized objects were uncovered in good
faith, 2 the fact that they tended to prove the commission of a crime unrelated to the charge for which the arrest was made would not bar their
admission into evidence upon trial for the unrelated crime.6
a. The Scope of Legitimate Seizure Incident to a
Valid Criminal Arrest
In order to determine the validity of the instant court's holding as to
the permissible scope of INS seizure, it is ultimately necessary to distinguish
between seizure of articles unrelated to the offense charged when the
search and seizure are conducted as incident to an arrest for crime pur-suantto a warrant judicially issued upon determination of "probable cause,"
and seizure of those same articles incidentally to arrest pursuant to a
warrant for administrative arrest for deportation." For purposes of the
immediate analysis, however, it will first be assumed that lack of a criminal
arrest warrant judicially issued for probable cause is not determinative of
the scope of permissible seizure in the instant case.
Although it is clear that not all articles uncovered in the course of a
valid search may legitimately be seized and offered in evidence against an
accused,8 it has been held that officers conducting a search incident to a
valid arrest for crime may seize instrumentalities used as means for the
commission of an unrelated crime when that crime is being committed in
their presence." In Harrisv. United States 67 defendant was arrested by
FBI agents armed with warrants charging mail fraud. In the course of
a search of defendant's four-room apartment without a search warrant,
the agents found Selective Service classification cards, evidence in no way
related to the crime for which defendant was arrested. The Supreme Court
enumerated four classes of objects which may be validly seized in the
by the FBI in a search of the wastebasket of appellant's room after INS agents had
checked appellant out. The first four of these articles are concededly relevant to the
deportation proceedings as well as to the criminal indictment and conviction. Appellant also claims that various other items seized from his hotel room led the FBI to
discovery of further incriminating evidence; see Brief for Petitioner, Appendix
"C" B, pp. 41-42, Abel v. United States, cert. granted,358 U.S. 813 (1958) (No. 263),
ordered for reargument, 359 U.S. 940 (1959). Conviction of a criminal accused at
a trial where evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment is itself admitted,
and conviction where evidence is admitted to which investigating officers were led
by use of articles seized in violation of the fourth amendment, are equally subject to
reversal. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) ; Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
307 (1921).
62. Instant case at 494.
63. Instant case at 496-97.
64. Compare note 39 supra, with notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text. And
see note 49 .supra.
65. United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930). Cf. United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932). And see Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 154 (1947).
66. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) ; Kelly v. United States, 197
F2d 162 (5th Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Braggs 189 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1951).
67. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
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course of a search incident to a valid arrest: "[1] the instrumentalities and
means by which a crime is committed, [2] the fruits of crime, such as stolen
property, [3] weapons by which escape of the person arrested might be
effected, and [4] property, the possession of which is a crime."68 And,
upholding conviction for unlawful possession of government property, the
Court said that defendant's illegal custody of the classification cards "was a
serious and continuing offense against the laws of the United States. A
crime was thus being committed in the very presence of the agents conducting the search." 0 Neither of the elements of the Harris holdingthat possession of the property seized was in itself illegal, and that, consequently, by virtue of that possession, a crime was being committed in
the presence of the arresting officers-was present in the circumstances of
arrest and search of appellant in the instant case. The court, nevertheless,
refused to limit the Harris rule "to situations in which the seized objects
.. happen to be contraband," 7D and, basing its decision on the Harris
dictum,7 ' held that "the papers taken from Abel's person were subject to
seizure, for it is clear that they were 'the instrumentalities and means' by
which he might commit the crime of espionage." 72
While the Harris dictum is little authority for the rule adopted by the
instant court, 73 nevertheless, were the criminal arrest standard here
applicable, the seizure of articles unrelated to the charge for which appellant was arrested in the instant case, and whose possession was not itself
unlawful, should probably be held constitutional in view of the fact that the
INS complied with every aspect of the standard which the Supreme Court
has heretofore held necessary to "reasonableness" 74 of the scope of search
and seizure incident to a valid arrest for crime. The fourth amendment
prohibits exploratory searches in quest for evidentiary material. 75 An
arresting officer cannot conduct a search without a warrant merely with
the hope that something will turn up to support the charge.70 The search,
incident to a valid arrest, must be conducted in "good faith," 7 7 based on a
68. Id. at 154.
69. Id. at 155.
70. Instant case at 497.
71. That "the instrumentalities and means by which a crime is committed" may
be seized in the course of a search incident to a valid arrest. Hrris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947). (Emphasis added.) See text accompanying note 68 supra.
72. Instant case at 497.
73. The cases cited by Harris-e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927) ; Agnello v. United States, 267 U.S. 20, 30 (1925)-stand only for the proposition that instrumentalities of the crime for which defendant is being arrested may
be seized without a search warrant incidentally to a valid arrest. Cf. note 88 infra
and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) ; Lawson v. United
States, 254 F2d 706 (8th Cir. 1958).
75. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, supra note 74; United States v. Lefkowitz,
285 U.S. 452 (1932) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) ; Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
76. Ibid.
77. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 153 (1947) ; Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 356-58 (1931).
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reasonable belief that weapons, 78 the fruits of the crime,7 9 instruments of
the crime,80 or illegally possessed property 8' will be found on the person
of the arrestee 82 or within the premises under his immediate control.p
In the instant case the INS agents complied with these requirements. The
court held that "the evidence in the record supports the finding of good
faith made by the court below" ; 84 the search was of appellant's person and
his small hotel room; s5 and the motive for the search, as both the trial and
appellate courts have held established by the evidence, was to find either
weapons 86 or evidence of alienage.87 What, it may be asked, happens
when, in the course of a valid search, articles are found which are instrumental in the commission of a crime other than that for which defendant
is being arrested? There would seem to be no valid reason to require that
the articles found be returned, or that if seized they be suppressed. The
Supreme Court has held that property seized under the authority of a
search warrant, may be "used in the prosecution of a suspected person for
a crime other than that which may have been described in the affidavit as
having been committed by him.

.

.

. [I]t would have been competent to

use them to prove any crime against the accused as to which they constituted relevant evidence." 88 Likewise, it would seem that when the
search is valid as incident to a lawful criminal arrest the same rule should
apply.8 9
78. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, supra note 77, at 154; Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154 (1947).
82. See note 78 supra.
83. Ibid.
84. Instant case at 494-96.
85. Id. at 492.
86. Id. at 494.
87. Ibid.
88. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1921).
89. This was the ratio decidend of the court of appeals holding in Harris v.
United States, 151 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1945), affirmed by the Supreme Court on the
ground that the seized property was illegally possessed, Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 154 (1947). See notes 67-69 supra. Per contra, it might be argued that,
while in the case of articles seized under a judicially issued search warrant, and of
necessity described with particularity therein, the scope or nature of the articles seized
is subject ab initio to the stringent control of a magistrate's examination, seizure of
articles hunted up by search incident to a valid arrest is altogether unlimited. In this
latter case, then, there is a special need to impose strict restrictions upon the class
of articles which may be seized, and delimitation in terms of relevance to the crime
for which the arrest is made is desirable. This may be said to be especially true in
view of the function served by strict restrictions of permissible seizure as inhibiting
motivation for unlawful search. See Comment, 34 N.Y.U.L. R v. 159, 166 (1959).
Moreover, without such restriction, the door may be opened to police practice which,
under guise of a valid arrest for some petty offense for which a warrant may be
secured, conducts a general exploratory search in quest of evidence of more serious
offenses. But the demonstrated vigilance of the courts to guard against such exploratory search practice (see United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931)), and the "good faith"
requirement, rigorously applied, see text and notes at notes 77-93 supra, may suffice
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b. The Scope of Legitimate Seizure Incident to a Valid Arrest
for Deportation
But while it may accord with the Constitution to hold that articles
seized incidentally to a valid arrest under a criminal arrest warrant, although unrelated to the crime for which a criminal defendant is being
arrested, can subsequently be admitted in evidence on trial for an unrelated
crime, ° it is submitted that when the arrest is made pursuant to an
administrative warrant issued by an agency charged with a specialized
function,91 and without judicial determination of probable cause, 92 the
scope of permissible seizure incident to that arrest should be strictly
limited. Certain federal agencies, among them the FBI, are charged with
the duty of enforcing the laws of the United States.93 Their power extends
to the investigation and detection of violations of all federal criminal laws.94
Given the scope of that power, the constitutional scope of search and seizure
incident to a valid arrest may be justifiably extended to permit the seizure
of articles instrumental in the commission of any crime whose prevention
is the duty of the arresting authority. When, however, a particular federal
agency is created for, and charged with, the duty of enforcing a particular
federal law, and in the exercise of that duty the agency need not comply
with many of the constitutional safeguards accorded criminal defendants,
there is no justification for the extension of its activities into areas of law
enforcement for which it has been given no responsibility. Thus, while
the immigration authorities in the instant case may conduct a search pursuant to their authorized functions for the purpose of revealing either
articles relating to the deportation offense for which appellant was arrested,
or, for the protection of the arresting officers, weapons by which escape
from custody might be effected 9 5 when the INS steps outside the realm
of administrative enforcement of the immigration laws to seize articles
having no relation to the deportable offense charged, and thus into the
realm of enforcement of the criminal law, the absence of those constitutional
safeguards applicable to arrests for crimes should render the attempted
seizure of articles not related to the scope of the agency's authority illegal
and unconstitutional."
to curb the danger. And, on the other hand, it would seem difficult to label "unreasonable," within the meaning of the fourth amendment, the taking of an instrumentality
of one crime uncovered in the course of a bona fide and wholly legitimate search for
the instrumentalities of another.
90. See text accompanying notes 64-89 supra.
91. The Immigration Act § 287.
92. See notes 14-15 supra.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1952).
94. Ibid.
95. See text accompanying notes 37-57 supra.
96. As was said in In re Ginsburg, 147 F2d 749, 750 (2d Cir. 1945), "each case
of this kind is a fact case. The correct decision of each depends not so much upon
a higher critical examination of the accumulated decisional gloss as upon a common
sense determination of whether, within the meaning of the word the Constitution
uses, the particular search and seizure has been 'unreasonable,' that is, whether what
was done and found bears a reasonable relation to the authority then possessed and
exercised or transcends it to become oppression."
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DUE PROCESS IN APPELLANT'S ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
DETENTION, INDICTMENT AND CONVICTION

But even if it be found that the procedures followed by the INS in the
instant case were within the statutory and constitutional authority of that
agency, appellant, nevertheless, has not been accorded his constitutional
rights. It is only by due contemplation of the entire process, from the first
information given to the INS by the FBI to the final indictment and trial,
that the procedure here followed can be adequately adjudged in its character
as a planned exercise of FBI police power. As such, that procedure, and
the search and seizure which formed so integral a portion of it, denied
appellant that due process of law to which aliens as well as citizens are
entitled.9 7 Of course there is no objection to the FBI giving information
to the INS in order better to enable it to administer the immigration laws;
no one would ask so drastic a separation of divisions within a single government department. Thus, if the FBI activity could be regarded as merely
in the nature of assistance to the INS, then appellant was only the victim
of routine and efficient intra-governmental cooperation, rather than of
concerted activity calculated to deprive him of his constitutional rights.
The FBI, however, did more than give assistance to its sister agency; it
was the pervasive, motivating force behind the entire action. It was from
information provided by the FBI that the INS first learned of appellant; 9 8
a Washington conference with the FBI alerted the INS to the security
implications of the case; 99 the scheme of action, clearly the result of careful
pre-planning, was coordinated at the offices of the FBI in New York '00
and executed by the agencies acting in concert.' 0 1 The very presence of the
FBI at the time and scene of the arrest ' 0 2 lends credence to the theory
that there was more involved here than a mere deportation proceeding.
While INS agents waited nearby, 10 3 the FBI was enabled by prearrangement to seek information from appellant, 1'4 with knowledge that if he did
not cooperate, he would be immediately arrested by the INS. 0 5 Having
97. See note 119 infra.
98. Testimony at Hearing on Motion to Suppress, Record, p. 158, by Kanzler,
Division Investigator of the INS. (Hereinafter all citations to the Record are taken
from the Hearing on Motion to Suppress unless otherwise indicated.)
99. Record, pp. 160-61, by Kanzler, Division Investigator of the INS.
100. Record, pp. 97-99, by Schoenenberger, Supervisory Investigator of the INS;
Record, pp. 134-36, by Farley, Supervisory Investigator of the INS.
101. Record, pp. 98-101, by Schoenenberger, Supervisory Investigator of the INS;
Record, pp. 135-40, by Farley, Supervisory Investigator of the INS; Record, pp.
190-91, by Blasco, Special Agent of the FBI.
102. Record, pp. 190-91, by Blasco, Special Agent of the FBI.
103. Record, pp. 137-40, by Farley, Supervisory Investigator of the INS; Record,
pp. 189-90, by Blasco, Special Agent of the FBI.
104. Record, pp. 97, 99, by Schoenenberger, Supervisory Investigator of the INS;
Record, p. 136, by Farley, Supervisory Investigator of the INS.
105. Record, pp. 183-84, by Blasco, Special Agent of the FBI.
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summoned the INS agents to arrest appellant, 1° 6 the FBI remained in his
hotel room throughout the period of the INS arrest, search and seizure. 1 7
After assisting the INS in checking appellant out of the hotel, 08 the FBI
then placed a guard over the door of the room, 0 9 and, after obtaining consent of the hotel manager," 0 made a thorough search of the room and
seized the contents of a wastebasket left unemptied by the INS search."'
The day after appellant arrived in the alien detention camp, he was again
questioned by FBI agents, this time for five hours,"1 2 whereas INS investigators, who supposedly had primary interest in appellant, questioned
him for less than ten minutes. 118 According to appellant-and this is not
denied by the Department of Justice in its answering affidavit " 4 -he was
further questioned by the FBI during three weeks after hearing and order
for deportation.:"
Moreover, no judicially examined warrant for appellant's arrest was obtained until one was issued upon the indictment for
conspiracy to commit espionage." 0
It strains the imagination to suppose that this process was not, of a
piece, engineered by the FBI. Throughout, the INS deferred in its legitimate purposes to permit FBI access to the appellant; a calculated evasion of
the rule that law enforcement agencies may not secure confinement to
confront and interrogate a suspect until they have arrested him upon
procurement of a warrant issued for probable cause. 17 It would seem that,
as soon as the FBI had ascertained that there was probable cause to believe
that appellant had committed a crime-and there is reason to believe that
they might have made this determination even before the arrest by the
106. Record, pp. 189-90, by Blasco, Special Agent of the FBI.
107. Record, p. 59, Affidavit of Maroney, Special Attorney for the Dep't of
Justice; Record, p. 191, by Blasco, Special Agent of the FBI.
108. Record, pp. 191-92, by Blasco, Special Agent of the FBI.
109. Record, p. 706, Trial Stipulation as to Testimony of FBI Agent.
110. Record, p. 70, Affidavit of FBI Special Agent Kehoe. See Record, p. 46,
for inventory of seized items.
111. Record, p. 694, Trial Testimony of FBI Special Agent Kehoe. Two articles
found, a cipher book and a hollowed pencil containing microfilm, were admitted in
evidence at appellant's trial. See note 61 supra.
112. Record, p. 60, Answering Affidavit of Maroney, Attorney for the Dep't of
Justice. Appellant named the investigators in his affidavit, Record, p. 30, who appear
to be the same agents who questioned him in his hotel room in New York. See
Record, pp. 174-76.
113. Record, p. 60, Answering Affidavit of Maroney, Attorney for the Dep't of
Justice.
114. See Record, pp. 55-62, Answering Affidavit of Maroney, Attorney for the
Dep't of Justice.
115. Record, p. 31, Affidavit of Appellant Abel in Support of Motion to Suppress.
116. Record, p. 62, Affidavit of Maroney, Attorney for the Dep't of Justice.
117. Such a statement would seem to be an elemental premise in our constitutional
guarantee of due process.
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INS was effected in New York 11 -there should have been strict compliance with the constitutional requirements for federal criminal proceedings, for at that point appellant was no longer merely an alien subject to
deportation and entitled only to the limited rights accorded persons under
proceedings which abut at that serious, but less severe sanction; he was a
suspected criminal as well. But not until the day of the indictment did
the judicial protections of all accused criminals become his, even though
the FBI had known of his whereabouts and had possessed, well before that
day, all the information-certainly enough to support a warrant for arrest
-that underlay indictment, and ultimately conviction. Such police tactics
as were used here would never be tolerated if a citizen criminal were the
victim. The rights of an alien subject to severe criminal penalty should be
no different. 19
An analogous situation to the cooperative efforts between the INS and
the FBI in the instant case is found on the state-federal level. A federal
officer may not direct or participate in a search by state officers that is
illegal under federal law but legal under state law, and use the evidence
obtained by the state officer in a federal prosecution, even though, constitutionally, the evidence might be admissible in a state court.'M Thus,
federal officers, held to a higher constitutional standard than are state
officers, may not procure the benefits of a less stringent procedural order by
"cooperating" with state authorities. This rule, it would seem, should be
even more cogently applicable to relations between two departments of the
federal government. Surely it would not be contended that the FBI could
circumvent the rules designed principally to keep its activities within
constitutional bounds, by arranging arrests and searches through less
strict INS procedures, when it could not successfully evade those same
118. Appellant's attorney theorized that the FBI was seeking to convert appellant
into a counter-espionage agent as they had his compatriot Hayhanen; thus no public
record of government interest in appellant was desired. The procedure followed was
consistent with this premise. See Record, p. 25, Affidavit of Defense Counsel Donovan;
and see Record, pp. 182-85 for discussion with FBI Special Agent Blasco during the
hearing on the motion to suppress concerning what the FBI sought from appellant.
Blasco's instructions were to call his superior if appellant cooperated and to convey
the extent of his cooperation. It appears that the cooperation sought was a willingness to answer questions, but the full testimony leaves some doubt as to the consequence to appellant if he agreed to cooperate.
On the other hand, the Government contended that they had insufficient evidence
to secure a warrant for appellant's arrest, because Hayhanen had refused to testify
in a public trial because of fear of reprisals. (In fact, nonetheless, he did testify
at the trial.) Thus, INS proceedings were in order, for there was sufficient information available to support an administrative warrant based on deportation charges.
See Record, p. 57, Answering Affidavit of Maroney, Attorney for the Dep't of
Justice. However, it is difficult under this gathering-of-evidence-from-a-willingwitness analysis to see why the FBI desired a private pre-arrest conference with
appellant, complete with special instructions in the event he gave desired information.
If the opportunity to question appellant was all that was wanted, there appears to be
no advantage in questioning him before his arrest by the INS on deportation charges,
rather than questioning him after that arrest.
119. Aliens are not without constitutional rights. See, e.g., Terrace v. Thompson,
263 U.S. 197 (1923); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896); Len
Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895).
120. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927).
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procedural requirements by acting in cooperation with state enforcement
agencies. Within the federal system, those courts which have held that
adjudged violations of constitutional rights in the course of police enforcement proceedings will be visited by judicial rejection of evidence or of
fruits of evidence obtained,' 2 ' and which have recognized that one of the
traditional functions of the courts is to police the police,' 22 should here
again insist that zealous law enforcement must be kept within the bounds of
our society's traditionally accepted notions of justice and order. Where a
circumvention of the Constitution's carefully erected machinery of protection is attempted by the concerted action of two parts of a single government department, parts of vastly different functions and powers, particularly
close checks should be made to see that the individual proceedings of each
agency do not overlap to the detriment of constitutional rights. The efforts
of the FBI to short circuit the stringent requirements which the Constitution places upon it should not be condoned, nor the due process of law so
fundamental to our democratic heritage be denied by indirection. That the
crime involved concerned the security of our nation does not justify abandonment of those ideals of fairness for which the nation purportedly stands.

INCOME

TAX-POBABITY OF APPEAL HEL

TEST Or PROPER

AccRuAL or LI&BrIy ix TixABim YEAR ENDING DuRING APPEAL
PERIOD
On December 22, 1948, the Tax Court determined the tax basis of
petitioner's franchise, the normal useful life of its motor coaches, and the
annual depreciation deductions properly allowable in respect of the franchise
and coaches," determinations which affected petitioner's income and excess
profits tax liability for the years 1940 through 1947.2 Petitioner did not
in 1948 actually pay those tax deficiencies for the years 1943 through 1947
which resulted indirectly from the court's 1948 decision, but, prior to
December 31, 1948, petitioner accrued on its books the amounts of the
deficiencies and interest determined by the adjustment, and deducted the
interest so accrued in its tax return for that year.3 Neither petitioner nor
the Commissioner appealed from the decision of December 22, 1948, and
that ruling therefore became final in March 1949, after the three-month
121. See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 434 (1957), for a recent
reiteration of this well-settled rule.
122. FED. R. ChaM. P. 5.
1. New York City Omnibus Corp., 7 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.899 (1948).
2. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 633, 638 (1959).
3. Pursuant to Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23, 53 Stat. 12, as amended (now
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 161, 163). "In computing net income there shall be allowed
as deductions: . . . (b) Interest-All interest paid or accrued within the taxable
year on indebtedness . .. ."
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appeal period had elapsed. 4 Subsequently the Commissioner disallowed the
claimed deduction for interest in the amount of $109,802.30 for the year
1948 on grounds that the liability therefor had not been finally determined
before the end of that year. The Tax Court, reversing, held that, because
on the facts there appeared insufficient probability of exercise of the right
of appeal, the liability was not contingent, and petitioner had properly
accrued and deducted the interest. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 31
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 633 (1959).
The federal taxation system requires a determination of annual taxes
predicated upon a base of economic events which occur during a taxable
year,8 and permits the allocation of taxable income in accord with any
consistent accounting scheme which clearly reflects income
The accrual
basis method of accounting, by which income earned and expenses incurred
are assigned to the period in which they become due rather than that in
which the due debt is actually paid off, has long been recognized as such a
system 7 Where it is utilized, the taxpayer will claim a deduction for the
period in which a deductible liability becomes definitely chargeable to
him; with particular reference to deductions for interest paid on tax
deficiencies, he may accrue such interest and thereafter deduct it in
computation of his net income 8 in the year in which his liability to pay
becomes fixed and definite.0 Where the liability arises as a result of litigation decided adversely to the taxpayer, it has been held that, before the
amount is properly accruable,
"all the events must occur in that year which fix the amount and the
fact of the taxpayer's liability . . .; and this cannot be the case
where the liability is contingent and is contested by the taxpayer.
4. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, cl. 1, § 1140,

CODE OF 1954, §§ 7481, 7483).
5. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954,

53 Stat. 163, as amended (now

INT. REv.

§441. See Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner,
321 U.S. 281 (1944). Burnett v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931) states:
"Only by such a system is it practicable to produce a regular flow of income and
apply methods of accounting, assessment, and collection capable of practical operation."
Id. at 365.
6. Ixr. Rxv.

CODE OF 1954, §§ 446 (a), (b) ; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 41,
53 Stat. 24. 2 MErs's, FEDA. INcomE TAxATioN, § 12.05 (1955): "The 1954 Code
provides as a general rule as did the 1939 Code, that the method of accounting regularly used by the taxpayer in keeping his books is to be used for tax purposes provided
it dearly reflects income." See also Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445
(1930); United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9 (1926).
7. Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn, 282 U.S. 92, 97 (1930), states that the
accrual method was "born of necessity." United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422
(1926), is perhaps the leading case in the area. See 2 MERTENS, FEDERAL INcOME
TAXAT ON, §§ 12.02-.06 (1955); 1 RABNN & JoHNsox, FEDERAL INcoME, GIFr &
ESTATE TAXAT O, § 12.02 (1954); Holland, Accrual Problems in Tax Accounting,
48 MIcE. L. REv. 149 (1949) ; Jones, What the Dixie Pine Decision Means, 23 TAXEs
336 (1945).
8. Pursuant to Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23, 53 Stat. 12, as amended (now
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 161, 163), quoted note 3 supra.

9. See Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn, 282 U.S. 92 (1930); United States

v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926); Pierce Estates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F2d
475, 477 (3d Cir. 1952); H. E. Harmon Coal Corp., 16 T.C. 787 (1951); Lehigh
Valley R.R., 12 T.C. 977 (1949). See also Treas. Reg. 111, §29.43-2 (1943).
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[The taxpayer] .
. must . . . await the event of the.
litigation and . .
claim a deduction only for the taxable year in
which its liability for the tax was finally adjudicated." 10
While it has been suggested that, for accrual purposes, contingency is never
resolved until a final judgment cannot be carried any further,1 1 the
Supreme Court itself has normally tested the accruability of expenses by
"a practical, not a legal test," 12 which demands of less-than-realized losses
that they be "so reasonably certain in fact and ascertainable in amount as to
13
justify their deduction . . . before they are absolutely realized." '
Within this concept, what constitutes a final adjudication, that is, at what
point in the process of litigation a tax liability becomes accruable, has been
in some measure progressively defined. Actual denial of liability against
those who assert it, whether in court or otherwise, constitutes a contested
and non-accruable liability. 14 The act of taking an appeal from a lower
court judgment which encompasses a deductible liability is deemed to
retain that liability in such a state of contingency as to prohibit immediate
accrual and deduction of the item during the pendency of the appeal. 15
But the amount becomes accruable if the time for an appeal has expired
without action on the part of the taxpayer ' 0 or if the litigation is settled
by contract which, in effect, binds the taxpayer not to further prosecute the
appeal; 17 and, in the case of tax adjudications, if the taxpayer enters into
a closing agreement determining his tax liability, he may accrue the deductible portion in the year of the agreement.' 8 Similarly, actual payment
of an asserted liability, even though under protest, 19 or payment after a
10. Dixie Pine Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516, 519 (1944). Cf. Lucas v.
American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930).
11. Holland, Accruad Problems in Tax Accounting, 48 MicH. L. REv. 149, 157
(1949).
12. Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930).
13. Ibid.
14. See Gunderson Bros. Eng'r Corp., 16 T.C. 118 (1951); Great Island Holding
Corp., 5 T.C. 150 (1945).
15. See Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944); Dixie
Pine Products Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516 (1944). See also Lehigh & H.
R. Ry., 13 B.T.A. 1154 (1928), aff'd, 38 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1930); Frank J. Jewell,
6 B.T.A. 1040 (1927).
16. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 1140(a), 53 Stat. 163, as amended (now INT.
REV. CoDE OF 1954, § 7481) provides: "The decision of the Board shall become final(a) . . . Upon the expiration of the time for filing a petition for review, if no
such petition has been duly filed within such time."
17. Cf. Columbus & So. Ohio Elec. Co., 26 T.C. 722 (1956).
18. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 7121. The agreement is accomplished on IRS
Form 906 (Closing Agreement as to Final Determination Covering Specific Matters).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7121 (b) provides: "If such agreement is approved by the
secretary or his delegate . . . such agreement shall be final and conclusive, and,
.(1)
the case shall not be reopened as to the matters agreed upon . . . and
(2) in any suit, action or proceeding, such agreement . . . shall not be annulled,
modified, set aside, or disregarded."
19. Chestnut Sec. Co. v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 574 (Ct Claims 1945);
Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Rothensies, 57 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
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judgment has been entered,20 permits accrual in the year of the payment.
The manifest principle of these various applications of the finality rule is
a care that the taxpayer shall not "shift deductions from year to year by
prematurely accruing a deduction not then due." 21 But whether the
taxpayer's own provisional and uncommitted decision not to appeal allows
accrual and deduction during the period after the judgment of the Tax
Court has been entered but before it becomes final by lapse of the time for
22
appeal, is a question not decided prior to the instant case.
The instant court derived a formula for use where the right of appeal
from an adverse tax judgment 2 remains extant over the close of the
taxable year, testing accruability of the deductible portion on an ad hoc
24
basis of degree of probability that the right of appeal will be exercised.
As a determination of fact on the circumstances of the individual case, and,
more particularly, on the basis of evidence of the accruing entry itself, and
of an informal conversation between two members of the petitioning taxpayer's board of directors, 25 the court found that petitioner had in fact
decided, before the end of the taxable year, not to appeal, and that therefore
"the dispute . . . [had] already been resolved." 2 6 This fact-based likelihood-of-appeal rule may be deemed to have the advantage of looking to
20. Utica Knitting Co. v. Shaughnessy, 100 F. Supp. 245 (N.D.N.Y. 1951).
The fact of payment is itself sufficient to support the deduction. See cases cited
note 19 supra.
21. Kenyon Instrument Co. v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 732, 738 (1951).
22. See 2 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 12.66, at 154 n.3 (1955).
Cf. H. Liebes & Co. v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 1937), involving
accrual of income; Lynch v. United States, 44 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1343, 53-1 U.S.

Tax Cas. 9125 (D. Ore. 1952), where taxpayer also made payment. But cf. Lepham
Bros., 45 B.T.A. 793 (1941). For accrual of income, however, final adjudication has
been interpreted to be at the expiration of the time to appeal. See H. Liebes & Co.
v. Commissioner, supra, at 938.
23. Presumably the rule of the instant case is applicable to any instance of a
judicial decision whose judgment comports a deductible loss (see, e.g., Lucas v.
American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445 (1930)), and which is subject to appeal during a
period that spans two taxable years. Although there exists the formal distinction
that a Tax Court decision does not become "final" until the actual date of lapse of the
appeals period (see note 16 supra), while an ordinary civil judgment is "final," for
some purposes, immediately upon entry of judgment (see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 58;
62 Stat. 957 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1952) ; Givens v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.
Co., 196 F.2d 905 (5th Cir. 1952)), the Supreme Court's emphasis upon practical,
as opposed to technical legal considerations (see text accompanying note 1Z supra),
would seem to argue for the extensibility of the instant holding to other than tax
adjudication cases. However, the long three-month appeal period makes the problem
particularly significant in cases involving Tax Court adjudications. In the discussion
following, this comment will focus particularly upon the case where the judicial
determination appealable over the end of a taxable year is a tax adjudication, and
application to other circumstances will be treated in note.
24. Instant case at 645.
25. Id. at 638. Nothing but oral evidence of a conversation between the two
executives during 1948, the year of accrual, was adduced at the trial. In February
1949, a discussion of the possibility of appeal in the event that the Commissioner
appealed the decision appeared in the minutes of a meeting of the board of directors.
Aside from the weakness of evidence tending to show that taxpayer had definitely
decided not to appeal in 1948, this latter evidence seems to indicate that the possibility of appeal was still a live issue in 1949.
26. Id. at 645.
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operative fact rather than "technical legal" symbol 2 7 as establishing the
certainty of liability; and it undoubtedly has the advantage of fairness to
the taxpayer litigant who has no intention of appeal and who wishes to
accrue and deduct in the earlier year without being forced, by the fortuitous
combination of the date of decision and an arbitrary appeals period, to
claim the deduction in a possibly less favorable period. But the rule
presents two very serious drawbacks. First, its flexibility may be easily
exploited by taxpayers who seize the opportunity to play a waiting game.
In the instant case, for example, the period of appeal from the initial
judicial determination of tax liability ran nearly a full three months into
the next taxable year. The court, in allowing petitioner to accrue in the
earlier year without having made any definitive statement or having taken
any conclusive action before the end of that year on the basis of which
might be imputed a binding decision not to appeal, allowed petitioner to
delay through almost the entire first quarter of the ensuing year, to
survey its completed tax data for 1948, to feel out the movements of
business for 1949, and then to elect whether appeal of the original tax
determination or accrual in the earlier period was more advantageous.
True, the court found evidence that decision not to appeal had actually been
made in 1948: petitioner in fact accrued the deficiencies and interest on
its books ; 28 two of its directors agreed among themselves that it would be
best not to appeal29 But such a record can always be made where a taxpayer intends to preserve for himself an advantageous option; should he

later find it more profitable to appeal, this record is of absolutely no
consequence, and he is bound to nothing. Especially where the amount of
the deduction is as large as in the instant case, 0 the court's likelihood-ofappeal test would seem to place an unwarranted amount of reliance upon its
own ability to determine how final the taxpayer deemed the initial judicial
decision during the time prior to the expiration of the appeal period, and,
in fact, at that specific moment when the taxable year closed. Rather,
more realistically, it would seem that, before the original tax dispute may
properly be termed resolved, and therefore basis for legitimate accrual, the
taxpayer should be required in some manner formally to acknowledge
his liability.81 This seems all the more demanded in that, secondly, the
problems inherent in the administration of the likelihood-of-appeal standard
are enormous. The Commissioner will himself be forced, often long after
the fact, to weigh and to pass upon questions of intent, on the basis of
evidence perhaps created expressly for the purpose of displaying a decision
27. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
28. Instant case at 638. But see note 37 infra.
29. Instant case at 638. See note 25 supra.
30. Slightly less than $110,000. See text following note 4 supra.
31. Deductions have been termed a matter of legislative grace; it would seem
therefore that a strict approach to a determination of the proper time for accrual
would be justified. For discussion of the origin and development of the legislative
grace doctrine as applied to deductions, see Kaminsky, Are All Deductilos a Matter
of Privilege?, 37 TAXES 137, 146, n.16 (1959).
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not actually made; subsequently he may have to rebut before the Tax
Court a taxpayer's proof as to the probability of the right of appeal being
exercised. Under such a standard, the wily taxpayer who knows in
advance exactly what evidence should and what evidence should not appear
upon a subsequent administrative record, holds all the advantage. On
the other hand, the taxpayer who in all honesty has no intention of appeal,
remains with a certain residuum of doubt as to whether he can make his
determination so apparent as to withstand judicial scrutiny. Such a subjective test for accruability seems altogether undesirable and unnecessary in
light of the ease of administration of a fixed rule calculated both to curb
the manipulative opportunities 32 and to obviate the baneful uncertainties 3
of the likelihood-of-appeal standard. Where the time for appeal, then,
spans two taxable years, a practical and equitable rule would require the
taxpayer, if he in fact decided before the end of the taxable year not to
appeal, and if he wished to accrue and deduct for the period of that earlier
year, to formally acknowledge the adjudged liability. 34 Ordinarily this
might be done by execution of a closing agreement which would absolutely
bind the taxpayer against further contest of tax liability.35 But, if the
tax authorities are themselves unwilling for some reason to conclude a
closing agreement,3 6 the court should be able itself to develop a doctrine of
estoppel whereby, by some formal gesture, perhaps by application or offer
to make a dosing agreement, the taxpayer would be deemed to have bound
himself subsequently not to contest tax liability, to the amount, at any
rate, of the judgment entered. It might be plausible to hold, even, that
32. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
33. A taxpayer who pays his computed tax for the two years involved on the
basis of a calculation which allocates the deduction to the wrong year may subsequently find himself barred by the statute of limitations when he seeks a refund. He
can avoid this risk only by deducting the expense for both years and leaving to the
tax authorities the decision as to which is proper; but for this he must pay the price
of interest upon the resulting deficiency when one of the two deductions is disallowed.
Holland, Accrual Problems in Tax Accounting, 48 Micr. L. R v. 149, 150-51 (1949).
The uncertainty of a subjective rule may therefore imperil the taxpayer himself, as
well as opening the way for evasions of the tax scheme; advantages of certainty inure
to the benefit of both the Government and the individual taxpayer.
34. "If the taxpayer definitely acknowledged liability there would seem to be no
objection to accrual before expiration of time to appeal." Holland, supra note 33,
at 157.
35. See note 18 s-upra.
36. The tax authorities will probably often be willing to close at terms dictated
by a judicial determination in which they have been successful. However, where the
Commissioner is dissatisfied with the judgment of the Tax Court, he may himself
be contemplating an appeal, and may refuse to enter into a binding agreement. The
possibility of the Commissioner's appealing, as opposed to the taxpayer's appealing,
Was ignored in the instant court's likelihood-of-appeal test on grounds that, if only
the Commissioner appealed, the tax deficiencies and interest assessed could only be
subject to increase, not to decrease, and that, at the least, the amount of the Tax
Court's assessment was certain and accruable. But, if the likelihood-of-appeal test
is discarded, the rule substituted for it must also leave room for the instance in which
the Commissioner will not settle finally with the taxpayer after judgment; the taxpayer should nevertheless be able to render certain, as a minimum liability due, the
amount of the Tax Court determination. It is to permit a unilateral act of selfobligation as a basis for accrual and deduction that the estoppel principle is invoked.
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the very act of accruing the liability upon the taxpayer's tax books 87 is
itself such a sufficient gesture; and, by giving the act of accruing entry an
estopping operation, permit the taxpayer to accrue and deduct by that act
alone or, perhaps, by accruing entry accompanied by notice to the Commissioner. 8 If, however, the taxpayer is so much undecided that he is
unwilling conclusively to commit himself not to appeal, clearly even he does
not regard the liability as fixed and definite, and he should not be allowed
a present deduction, regardless of the statistical probabilities of appeal.
The operation of such a fixed rule would be consistent with accepted tax
accounting theory,3 9 and would, at the same time, provide the Commissioner
with a standard which is flexible and functional while remaining practicably
administrable. Nor would the burden on the taxpayer be unreasonable.4 °
37. For this purpose, it should be accrual on the taxpayer's tax books, rather than
on any other set of books he may keep, which should work estoppel. Liabilities are
accrued under regular, as distinguished from tax accounting, practice if they can
properly be called "sufficiently definite," but not if liability is considered "highly
contingent." The accountant is charged with determining the nature of the liability
according to the circumstances of each case, and in certain situations where he regards
the contingency as slight, he may properly decide that accrual is necessary in order to
reflect correctly the income or true condition of the business. Such accrual is usually
explained in a footnote to the statement which offers a detailed description of whatever
interpretive information is considered necessary. For the purpose of informing the
stockholders of the future prospects of the business, certain items might be included
to reflect a conservative estimate of the company's position. Accrual of liabilities
for tax purposes, however, is not measured exclusively in terms of accountant's
judgments, theoretical statements, or explanatory footnotes. Accrual for tax purposes
involves no consideration of the appearance of the statement to stockholders; it is to
the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code that tax accrual must conform.
Certainly, the considerations are similar, but case law has developed a distinct test
for accrual of a liability for tax purposes, and it is entirely feasible to imagine an
item that is properly accruable for ordinary accounting purposes that would not be
accruable for tax purposes.
A test, then, that measured tax accruability of a liability resulting from a judicial
determination by whether the taxpayer in fact accrued the liability on books kept for
other than tax purposes would not be effective, precisely because of the different
meaning ascribed to accrual depending upon its purpose in the particular case. See
generally KEsTin ADvANCED ACCOUNTING 416 (1946); MAGILL, TAXABLE INcoME
198-200 (Rev. Ed. 1945); 2 MFRTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXAToI
§§ 12.03, .05, .61
(1955) ; Holland, supra note 33. Similarly, an accruing entry on other than tax
books should not work an estoppel. But where the entry is made on taxpayer's tax
books, indicating taxpayer's definitive intention to accrue and deduct during that
period, there is no reason why an estopping effect should not be attached to that entry
itself, and deduction be allowed.
38. Such a rule might also be extended beyond Tax Court determinations to other
judicial judgments which comport deductible liabilities and whose appeal period spans
two taxable years. Here, too, the taxpayer ought to be permitted by some unilateral
act to so fix his liability as to legitimate accrual. If he is made aware of the estopping
effect of the entry of accrual, the estoppel doctrine will work no particular hardship.
Under standard practice, the liability will not in any event be accrued if the taxpayer
is contemplating appeal. But, certainly, in instances involving private civil litigation,
notice to the opposing party, as well as to the Commissioner, acknowledging liability
to the extent of judgment should be required.
39. See note 37 spra.
40. The proposed rule may effectively shorten the statutory period for taking
an appeal in only those cases in which the taxpayer regards the ability to accrue the
deductible portion of the judgment in the year of decision as more important than
the opportunity to appeal the case and take the same deduction in a later year. To
place this burden on the taxpayer faced with this choice is not inequitable since it
only requires him to observe accepted tax accounting theory.
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Under any rule which establishes with certainty the period to which an
expenditure must be allocated, the deduction is never lost; it is merely put
back into that taxable year in which it becomes fixed and definite-in
principle, a requirement for the accruing of any liability.41 In light, then,
of its strain on accepted tax accounting theory, of its potentialities for
taxpayer distortion of due taxes, and of its difficulties of efficient administration, the probability-of-appeal test of the instant case seems inadequate
to the needs of the federal tax scheme. It should be rejected in favor of
a fixed, objective rule.

RELEASE-GENRAL RELASE GVN Co URPNT TOTFEASOR
HELD INEFFECTIVE To DISCHARGE, DEFENDANT RA moAD iN FELA
AcTioN

Plaintiff, a railroad employee, was sent by his employer on an errand
which necessitated his crossing the premises of Warner Brothers. There
he slipped and fell on a snow covered sidewalk, seriously injuring his back.
Without the railroad's knowledge and for consideration wholly paid by
Warner Brothers, plaintiff executed a general release discharging Warner
Brothers "and all other persons, firms, and corporations" from liability
for the injury.- In an action brought by plaintiff against the railroad under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act,2 predicated upon the railroad's

negligence in requiring plaintiff to walk along a known dangerous route
when in a weak and exhausted condition, the railroad joined Warner
Brothers as third-party defendant. In response to interrogatories, the
jury found that plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by the railroad's

negligence and his own contributory negligence, and that Warner Brothers
was not guilty of negligence proximately causing the injury.3
Upon
railroad's motion for entry of judgment non obstante veredicto, held:
that plaintiff's release of Warner Brothers was ineffective to discharge the
railroad from liability for plaintiff's injury.4 Panichella v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 167 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
41. Note 9 supra.
1. Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 167 F. Supp. 345, 348 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1958).
2. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952) (hereinafter referred
to as FELA).
3. The interrogatory addressed to the jury on the issue of Warner Brothers'
liability required a "yes" or "no!' answer to the question of whether Warner was
"guilty of negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident." Panichella
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 167 F. Supp. 345, 347 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 1958). (Emphasis
added.) Railroad, in a motion for a new trial, contended unsuccessfully that the
phrasing of the interrogatory effectively restricted the jury to a choice between
finding Warner solely responsible for the accident or absolving it from all liability.
In its discussion of the railroad's rights under the release secured by Warner, however, the instant court regarded Warner as an independent concurring tortfeasor.
4. In an earlier proceeding involving the same parties, upon Warner Brothers'
motion to dismiss the railroad's third-party complaint, the court ruled after hearing
argument that the parties to the release had not contemplated that the instrument
should release the plaintiff's claim against the railroad. See note 28 infra.
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English common law regarded a release of one of several tortfeasors
who had acted jointly or concurrently as a release of the others on the
theory that the acts of the tortfeasors gave rise to a single cause of action
which the victim's release extinguished.5 Although some American courts
distinguish between joint and concurrent tortfeasors, so that the victim
of independent concurrent torts can release one wrongdoer without prejudicing his rights against the others,0 most jurisdictions apply the English
rule indiscriminately to releases of independent tortfeasors as well as to
releases of tortfeasors who have acted in concert.7 The harshness of this
rule has led to its modification by various expedients. In some jurisdictions,
recognition of the covenant not to sue has given the injured party an
effective means of releasing one concurrent tortfeasor without releasing all.8
A number of states, including Pennsylvania,9 have enacted the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which provides that unless the
agreement so stipulates, release of one tortfeasor does not release the others;
however the injured party's total recovery against the remaining tortfeasors
is reduced by the consideration paid for the release, or by any sum or
proportion specified in the release, if greater than the consideration paid. 10
The principle of the statute, and of more recent common-law decisions in
several jurisdictions interpreting qualified releases as covenants not to
sue," or holding an express reservation of rights against third parties
effective to bar release of a non-contracting joint tortfeasor,' 2 imports a
conceptual approach opposed to that of the traditional English and American rules. While the latter rules attach jural consequences to the release
by operation of a blanket rule of law couched in analytic categories"joint tort," "concurrent tort," "release," "covenant not to sue"-and
independent of the intent of the parties to the instrument,' 3 the newer
concept views the problem in terms of contract interpretation and looks
5. Cocke v. Jenner, Hob. 66, 80 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1614).
6. See, e.g., Husky Refining Co. v. Barnes, 119 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Pittsburgh Ry. v. Chapman, 145 Fed. 886 (3d Cir. 1906); Young v. Anderson, 33 Idaho
522, 196 Pac. 193 (1921).
7. See, e.g., Bee v. Cooper, 217 Cal. 96, 17 P.2d 740 (1932) ; Lisoski v. Anderson,
112 Mont. 112, 112 P.Zd 1055 (1941) ; Burke v. Burnham, 97 N.H. 203, 84 A2d 918
(1952); Aljian v. Ben Schlossberg, Inc., 8 N.J. Super. 461, 73 A.2d 290 (Super. Ct.
1950). Cf. PRossaR, TORTS § 46, at 243 (2d ed. 1955).
8. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Glover, 184 Ark. 1159, 45 S.W2d 521 (1932); Joyce
v. Massachusetts Real Estate Co., 173 Minn. 310, 217 N.W. 337 (1928); Liqero v.
Marfins, 53 R.I. 514, 167 Atl. 112 (1933). Cf. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 885(2) (1939).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-89 (Supp. 1958).
10. UNIom CONxIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS Acr § 4. See 9 UNIFORMz L.
ANN. 242 (1957).
11. E.g., Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N.Y. 455, 66 N.E. 133 (1903).
12. E.g., Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954); Black v.
Martin, 88 Mont. 256, 292 Pac. 577 (1930); Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 100
Ohio St. 348, 126 N.E. 300 (1919).
13. Under such a concept, express reservation of rights is ineffective. Roper v.
Florida Pub. Util. Co., 131 Fla. 709, 179 So. 904 (1938) ; MacDonald v. Henry Hornblower & Weeks, 268 Mich. 626, 256 N.W. 572 (1934).
See generally PROSSER,
TORTS §46, at 243-44 (2d ed. 1955).
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to the intent of the parties. The further innovation of the Uniform Act
is the provision of a general rule of construction for releases in which no
express reservation of rights is made: a general release is presumed not
to intend relinquishment of rights against third parties, and the burden of
specific provision is placed upon the settling tortfeasor.' 4
Under the FELA, which gives employees of interstate railroads
negligence action against employers for work injuries, enforceable in either
state or federal courts and free of certain common-law defenses, 15 the
validity of a release is governed by federal law as gathered from the same
sources to which, before the Erie decision, federal courts looked in diversity
cases.' 0 Such federal decisions have long recognized the effectiveness of
explicit reservation of an injured party's claims against noncontracting
joint tortfeasors; 1 7 in a non-FELA case, McKenna v. Austin,'8 involving
a question of the effect of an expressly qualified release given to one tortfeasor upon the liability of another, an influential circuit court opinion has
said that the crucial question is "whether the settlement is made and
accepted as full satisfaction or merely as the best obtainable compromise
for the settler's [individual] liability, . . ." and that "partial satisfaction
taken in compromise and release of liability of one or some of the wrongdoers does not discharge the others." -1 The court rejected any scheme of
14. Compare

RESTATFmNT,

Tonrs §885 (1939).

Prosser has pointed out the

wisdom of this shift of the burden, in light of the propensity of injured persons to
sign releases, ignorant of the law. PRossER, TORTS § 46, at 246 (2d ed. 1955).
15. I.e., fellow-servant and assumption of risk; instead of the common-law defense
of contributory negligence, the act requires the application of comparative negligence
principles to reduce the amount of the contributorily negligent employee's recovery.
35 Stat. 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§53, 54 (1952).
16. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1951); Ricketts v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 153 F2d 757 (2d Cir. 1946). Cf. Stella v. Kaiser, 221 F2d 115
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 853 (1955) ; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
60 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. Pa. 1945), afftd per curiam, 154 F.2d 291 (3d Cir 1946). In
a case similar to the instant case, a New York court applied New York law in
determining the effect on a railroad employer's FELA liability of a release given to
a stevedoring company not subject to the act, apparently upon the theory that the
release, as a contract executed in New York dealing with an accident which occurred
there, should be construed in accordance with New York law even if the incidental
effect of such a construction should be the extinguishment of a federal right. Falco v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 202 Misc. 769, 109 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1951). The tenability
of this position, however, in the light of the Supreme Court's expressed concern that
there should be substantial uniformity of result in the enforcement of rights created
by the FELA, is most questionable. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., supra. But cf.
Dura Elec. Lamp Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Z49 F.2d 5, 6 (3d Cir. 1958).
See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Cmnpetence and Discretion in the
Choice of Natioal and State Rules for Decision, 105. U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957).
17. McKenna v. Austin, 134 F2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943), Annot, 148 A.L.R.
1253 (1944) ; Carey v. Bilby, 129 Fed. 203 (8th Cir. 1904).
In a federal case involving a covenant not to sue, it has been held that a tortfeasor cannot avail himself of a release given to an independent concurring tortfeasor.
Husky Refining Co. v. Barnes, 119 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1941). In a case dealing with
a release of a defendant who had contributed to payment of a judgment, the instrument
reserving rights against non-contributing defendants, it has been held that the release
is ineffective as to a non-contributing defendant United States ex tel. Marcus v.
Hess, 154 F2d 291 (3d Cir. 1946), affirming, 60 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. Pa. 1945).
18. 134 F2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
19. Id. at 664, 665.
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categorization attaching ipso facto legal effects to various instruments of
settlement 20 and placed its holding that the release was no bar to action
21
against a noncontracting tortfeasor squarely upon intention of the parties.
But if the effect of a release is a matter of contractual intent, this should
be so whether the release does or does not explicitly reserve rights against
third parties; absence of specific and express provision, while making intention more difficult of judicial ascertainment, should not alter the legal
effect of that intention once known. As in other problems of construction
of releases, the question of intent is for the trier of fact 22 and, while it
may be proper to surround this determination with rules of construction
operating as presumptions (such as, for example, the rule that the burden
of proof lies upon a party attacking the "prima facie validity" of a release
on grounds of fraud or mutual mistake),2 it is equally erroneous for a
court to rule that a release, ipso facto and by rule of law, is a bar to action
against a joint tortfeasor, or for a court to rule that it is no bar.24 Nor
20. "[D]istinction between a 'release' and a 'covenant not to sue' is entirely
artificial." Id. at 661. "In determining the character as well as the effect of such an
agreement, we are unwilling to concede so much potency to mere verbalism. The
matter does not require the formalism of conveyancing. Whether words of 'release'
or of 'covenant' are used, the effect should be the same. Wide acceptance of the
distinction, notwithstanding its want of substance, and the decisions that in applying
it intention should control, point the way to reexamination of the rule and its foundations." Id. at 662. "It is not material whether the instrument be considered a release
or a covenant not to sue." Id. at 665. Similarly: "Tortfeasors come severally into
court, however many may be brought in together. . . . Whether they act independently or in concert, the nexus of liability between them and the person their acts
combine to injure is not and has not been entire." Id. at 664.
21. More exactly, the court stated that the determinative consideration was
"whether the settlement is made and accepted as full satisfaction." Id. at 664. For
a suggestion that the "full satisfaction" test may involve other considerations than
those normally incident to determination of party intention in contract construction,
see note 24 infra. In any event, it is clear that "whether or not the settlement amounts
to full reparation is to be determined, not merely from the fact of settlement, but as
the facts of the particular situation dictate." Id. at 665.
22. Callen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332 U.S. 625 (1948) (FELA).
23. See id. at 630.
24. There are, however, two arguments which might be made in support of the
position that, having rejected the doctrine that a release, ipso facto and independent
of party intent, does discharge a noncontracting joint tortfeasor, it is not untenable
to hold that a release, ipso facto and independent of party intent, does not discharge
a joint tortfeasor. The first is doctrinal. It runs to the effect that, there being no
privity of contract between the injured party and the noncontracting tortfeasor, nothing
in the act of execution of the contract can affect the rights of the injured party as
against that noncontracting tortfeasor. Precisely because we have held that execution
of the release does not ipso facto destroy plaintiff's claim (upon grounds of the
metaphysical inseverability of that claim), we must now hold that the release, as
a matter of law, does not destroy that claim, there being no grounds of destruction
left but those of contract itself, and no contractual relation existing between plaintiff
and the noncontracting party. But, even leaving apart possible invocation of third
party beneficiary contract doctrine, this argument misconceives the grounds upon
which the release is deemed to affect plaintiff and his claim. The release of the
joint tortfeasor, where allowed as the effect of a settlement contract between two other
persons, is not by operation of contract, but on the theory that plaintiff's claim has
already been fully satisfied, a conclusion of fact as to which the intention of the contracting parties is merely evidentiary. See Gronquist v. Olson, 242 Minn. 119, 64
N.W.2d 159 (1954) ; PRossER, ToRTs § 46, at 246 (2d ed. 1955). The contrary doctrine, that a release did discharge the noncontracting third party, was never based
upon contract principles; see text accompanying note 5 supra and McKenna v. Austin,
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are the words of the release here so clear in implication that the court could
134 F2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; PRossER, ToRTs § 46, at 243 (2d ed. 1955) ; and the
concept of privity should have no place in the question.
But, if this analysis is correct, the second, more substantial argument arises.
If what the law is concerned with is full satisfaction to plaintiff, why not a rule that
no release can ever operate to bar suit against a noncontracting joint tortfeasor?
Can it ever be said that plaintiff is fully satisfied until the amount of satisfaction
due him has been duly assessed by a trial jury? Nor will a blanket no-bar rule
subject defendants to inequitable multiple liabilities, since the sum recovered from
one joint tortfeasor in consideration of release must be credited pro tanto to diminish
the damages recoverable against the other. PRossER, ToRTs § 46, at 246 (2d ed.
1955). Such a rule would not appear to discourage releases, nor to hamper injured
parties in settlement negotiations, since each particular tortfeasor will still be anxious
to contractually limit his own liability. The major shoal upon which this argument
runs aground is the noncontracting tortfeasor's right to contribution from his released
joint tortfeasor. Such a blanket no-bar rule would, apparently make impossible a
release of the noncontracting tortfeasor even by a contract expressly and explicitly
releasing him. But, in this case, could the settling tortfeasor be secure against a
future liability for contribution to the noncontracting tortfeasor in the event that
the injured party recovered against the latter a judgment in excess of twice the
consideration paid for the release? The state of the law is most unclear. See Annot.,
8 A.L.R.2d 196 (1949). The McKenna court was apparently much troubled by the
potential effect upon contribution rights as between joint tortfeasors of even its
holding that, where the parties wished and specifically provided for reservation of
plaintiff's claim against the noncontracting tortfeasor, the release was no bar to
plaintiff's action. In long and considered dictum, the court argued that a release
by plaintiff as to tortfeasor A should operate to bar not only any subsequent suit by
plaintiff against A, but also to bar any suit for contribution against A by A's joint
tortfeasor B, if plaintiff should sue and recover judgment against B: "settlement
should be final, both to forestall further recovery by the injured person and to preclude contribution." 134 F.Zd at 665. Realizing the inequity of this situation as to B,
whose recognized right against A had been cut off by a contract to which he was
not a party, the court suggested that such a result might perhaps be "justified as a
sort of a penalty for refusing to settle." Id. at 665. Not thoroughly easy about this
resolution, however, the court suggested an "alternative solution," id. at 666: plaintiff's judgment against B was to be reduced by credit of one-half of the judgment
itself, rather than by the amount received in settlement from A, whenever the judgment amounted to more than twrice the settlement figure. It is rather difficult to
square this last solution with the fundamental postulate of the no-bar rule, that
plaintiff's fullness of satisfaction be a question for a trial jury; here plaintiff's
satisfaction is arbitrarily limited to twice the amount of the settlement he negotiates.
But that is better for plaintiff, at least, than arbitrary limitation to the settlement
value itself.
Even this uneasy modus sivendi suggested by McKemma, however, was soon entirely upset. In Henry Fuel Co. v. Whitebread, 236 F2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the
same circuit court expressly declined to follow the McKenna dictum-which, it said
"may profitably be re-examined," id. at 746--and reversed the dismissal of a thirdparty complaint against a settling tortfeasor in a suit by the releasor against a
noncontracting joint tortfeasor. "That the injured plaintiff could release her own
claim against appellee . . . is clear. The assertion that she could likewise extinguish
appellant's claim to contribution raises a wholly different question." Ibid. In the
instant proceeding, the district court did follow McKenna, and granted Warner's
motion for summary judgment relieving it of any liability to the railroad on the
third-party claim, on grounds that plaintiff's release to it operated to bar the railroad's right of contribution. "[As a logical syllogism, it would follow that no right
exists on the part of railroad to secure contribution from Warner since, as between
railroad and Warner, no cause of action remains in the plaintiff except against railroad. Warner is entitled to the finality of its settlement. To hold otherwise, in my
judgment, would discourage compromise and settlement between parties." Panichella
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 150 F. Supp. 79, 81 (W.D. Pa. 1957). The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit refused to review this dismissal, and remanded with directions
to vacate the district court's order under FED. R. Civ. P. 54 (b), purporting to make
the dismissal an appealable final judgment. Panichella v. Pennsylvania R-R., 252
F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1958). But the threat of the Whitebread decision still remains.
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have itself decided the issue of their intendment.2
"All other persons,
firms, and corporations," - must be read in context of the settlement
situation. The most likely application of the language is to parties whose
interests are directly involved with Warner's-its agents and associates 2 7
-rather than to third persons such as the railroad, not immediately involved in the plaintiff-Warner relationship. Courts should not be quick
to read into language, wholly explicable as affecting only the direct interests
of the contracting parties, an intention to confer benefits upon extraneous
third persons. The instant holding, then, refusing to give judgment for
defendant railroad as a matter of law, and thus extending the McKenna
rule to cases of releases not in express terms reserving plaintiff's rights
against third parties, is clearly in line with the most enlightened modern
authority.
The instant district court, however, did not send the issue of intent to
the jury. Rather, it ruled, after hearing to the court,28 that plaintiff's
If a release to tortfeasor A is not competent to release A from liability to contribution to tortfeasor B, and if A and the plaintiff, even by express contract provision,
cannot work a relinquishment of B's liability to plaintiff, how much security can A
buy? How much assurance of immunity can plaintiff sell? The efficacy of releases
is in very large part undermined, and negotiation of settlements very much impeded.
Allowing the release as between plaintiff and A to foreclose B's right to contribution,
the McKenna suggestion, on the other hand, is clearly inequitable to B. While this
dilemma was not insufferable under the McKenna intention-of-the-parties doctrine as
to the effect of plaintiff's release of A upon plaintiff's right as against B, inasmuch
as plaintiff and A could, by express provision, bar a subsequent suit by plaintiff
against B and thus secure A perfect immunity, the contribution problem becomes a
perpetual frustration to settlement under a rule that no release, whatever the intention
of the parties, can extinguish all of plaintiff's claims. Moreover, there may be
reasons other than a fear of potential future liability for contribution which will
cause A to wish to extinguish B's responsibility to plaintiff, as well as his own. He
may want to wash his hands of the whole affair, be secure against future appearance
as a witness, against all future involvement. Shall we deny the right of plaintiff to
give A full security? In sum, we are returned to the conclusion that the rule supported by McKenna and other controlling federal authorities (see, e.g., Stella v.
Kaiser, 218 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 1954), a~firtnance upheld on rehearing, 221 F.2d 115
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 853 (1955) ; United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,
60 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd per curiant, 154 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1946) ;
but see Dura Elec. Lamp Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 249 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1957)),
is also best supported by reason. The parties to a release must be able, by the terms
of their contract itself, to determine whether or not they will expunge all claims
of plaintiff as against a noncontracting joint tortfeasor.
25. Compare Stella v. Kaiser, supra note 24, where the noncontracting party
was named eo noinine in the release.
26. Instant case at 348-49 n.3.
27. The release discharges "Warner Brothers Pictures, Incorporated, and his,
her, their and its successors and assigns heirs, executors, administrators, and all
other persons, firms, and corporations." Ibid. This location of the "all other persons"
clause in suite of third parties immediately allied in interest with Warner, and the
absence in the release of any other words discharging persons in Warner's employ
or in other association with it, argues strongly for interpretation of the clause as
restricted to persons occupying some immediate relationship to Warner. At pre-trial
conference, in fact, the judge ruled that the release was ambiguous, and, after hearing
to the court, found that the negotiating parties had had no specific intention of releasing
railroad. See note 28 infra. Railroad's motion for judgment non obstante was not
based upon a theory of contract interpretation. Ibid.
28. At pretrial conference, the court ruled that the release was ambiguous and
ordered a hearing on the issue of the intent of plaintiff's counsel and Warner's insurance adjuster at the time of settlement. Testimony to the court convinced it that
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release of Warner Brothers did not discharge the railroad. And its
opinion, on denial of railroad's motion for judgment non obstante, reasons
upon broad and rigid doctrinal principles not only unnecessary to decision
of the narrow issue before it 2 9 but also obscure and potentially dangerous
in its implications for decision of future cases. The court distinguishes,
first, between the effect of a release of one of several independent concurrent tortfeasors and the effect of a release of one of several joint tortfeasors,30 and argues, second, that to release an FELA employer "when
no part of the consideration was paid by the employer" would have
"rendered nugatory and impotent . . . an action premised upon an act
of Congress, serving a federal purpose." 3 1 But, by definition, every release
renders nugatory and impotent the right released, that being the precise
purpose of such an agreement. If the sum paid for the release was in
fact intended by the parties as full satisfaction for the releasor's injury,
the extinction of the right only carries out the intention of the parties.
Where such intent is dear, moreover, it is irrelevant that the party asserting the release as a defense has paid no part of the consideration, since
the purpose of allowing a tortfeasor to avail himself of a release-to limit the
injured person to a single satisfaction for his injury 32-is served equally well
by a satisfaction derived solely from the tortfeasor named in the instrument
or by a satisfaction to which the party pleading the release has contributed.
In the absence of a statutory command to the contrary, the fact that the
right is federally created should not prevent its being relinquished under
proper circumstances. By providing for assertion of railroad workers'
injury claims through negligence actions brought in state or federal courts,
Congress may be assumed to have intended, except where it provided
otherwise, that the ordinary incidents of a negligence action, including the
ability of the claimant to release the employer from liability as part of a
settlement, without resort to litigation, should attend the federally created
cause of action.3 The choice of whether to seek a settlement or to press
the parties had had no specific intention of releasing railroad, and, on railroad's
motion to dismiss, the court ruled that the release was ineffective to discharge
plaintiff's FELA claims. Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 150 F. Supp. 79 (W.D.
Pa. 1957). Railroad apparently never argued that it should be allowed to take the
issue of contractual intent to the jury, but relied all through the proceedings upon
its contention that the release extinguished its liability ipso facto and by operation
of law.
29. For suggestion that the holding of the instant case, as distinguished from its
reasoning, is unobjectionable, see note 38 infra. Clearly the court did not have to
decide that, as a matter of law, the release was ineffective to discharge plaintiff's claim
against his employer. The only question before it, on defendant's motion for judgment non obstante, was whether the release did, as a matter of law, discharge that
liability.
30. Instant case at 349-50.
31. Instant case at 349.
32. PRossER, ToRrs § 46, at 245-46 (2d ed. 1955).
33. Cf. Callan v. Pennsylvania R.R., 332 U.S. 625, 630 (1948) : "But until the
Congress changes the statutory plan, the releases of railroad employees stand on the
same basis as the releases of others. One who attacks a settlement must bear the
burden of showing that the contract he has made is tainted with invalidity, either
by fraud practiced upon him or by a mutual mistake under which both parties acted."
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the claim is for the injured worker; provided his choice to accept a
settlement is made advisedly, it should not be defeated because it proves to
have been unwise. And as to the "joint"-"concurrent" distinction, this is
precisely the kind of sterile doctrinal analysis rejected by the McKenna
court. It is suggested therefore, that, instead of putting the issue in its
"proper perspective," 34 the instant court's reliance on the sanctity of federally created rights and the concurrent tortfeasor doctrine served rather
to obscure the issue of whether the release in fact or by intention of the
parties to it fully satisfied the plaintiff's claim. The answer to this question
of fact, rather than doctrinal distinctions or solicitude for federally created
rights, should be determinative of the rights of the litigants in this
situation.35
But to say this much is not to determine whether the instant court's
procedure, in failing to send the question of the intention of the contracting
parties to the jury, was erroneous. The court itself, of course, was not
called upon to decide that question.3 6 But the course of its reasoning may
appear to suggest that, had the issue before it been a railroad motion for
new trial predicated upon a refusal to send the issue of intendment of the
release to the jury, the court would have found no error. We have
suggested above that a trial court's failure to so submit that issue, on
grounds that the question as to the effect of the release was one to be
determined by a scheme of conceptual categories, as a matter of law,
would have been erroneous. But might the instant court have withdrawn
the issue on grounds that the intention of the parties was so indisputably
manifest as to leave no fact controversy for the jury? Parties to a release,
like parties to other types of written contracts, are held to an objective
standard of intention, and where "the terms of the release are clear and
precise, the release should be given effect according to its terms." 3 Unless
there remains an ambiguity in the words expressive of intent, there is no
issue for the trier of the fact; the court may rule summarily upon the legal
effects of the language used.38 And in determining whether the contractual
provision is so ambiguous as to necessitate the resolution of its intendment
by a jury, it may be legitimate for the court to apply certain fixed rules of
construction which, in effect, throw a burden of explicit expression upon
34. Instant case at 349.

35. See McKenna v. Austin, 134 F2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Gronquist v. Olson,
242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W2d 159, 164, 165 (1954) ; PRossm, ToRTs §46 (2d ed. 1955);
22 MiNNr L. REv. 692 (1938).
36. See note 42 infra.
37. Solar Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 156 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
38. Dura Elec. Lamp Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 249 F.2d 5 (3d Cir. 1957).
In the Dura case, and in Solar Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 156 F. Supp. 51
(W.D. Pa. 1957), and Combined Bronx Amusements, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 132 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), all civil anti-trust suits, releases to purported co-conspirators of defendants were held, on summary judgment, to effect
extinguishment of plaintiffs! rights against defendants. The language of these cases
may be read as invoking the older common-law concept of the ipso facto effect of
release, independent of all question of party intent; and, inasmuch as the opinions

speak of "joint!' liability, see, e.g., Combined Bronx Amusements, Inc. v. Warner
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one or the other of the parties. Such is the rule of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act: "A release by the injured person of one
joint tortfeasor . . . does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless the
release so provides." 39 Such, on the other hand, is the rule of the Restatement that "a document in the usual form of a release," unless there is
language manifesting the intent of the releasor to reserve his rights against
noncontracting joint tortfeasors, "is construed as intended to discharge all
claims for the tort and operates to discharge others also liable for the same
harm." 40 The latter appears to represent the view presently taken by the
federal courts,4 1 and would authorize withdrawal of the issue from the
jury in the instant case only for the purpose of giving judgment for
defendant railroad.4 2 But even if the principle of the former rule be adopted,
Bros. Pictures, Inc., supra, at 922, and are, in terms of traditional doctrine, distinguishable on this ground from such "concurrent" liability cases as McKenna, it
might be argued that there is substantial basis in federal case law for the "joint"
tort-"concurrent" tort distinction employed as a controlling rationale by the instant
court. Dura uses also language of "release" and "covenant" Dura Elec. Lamp Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., supra, at 7. But both Dura and Solar rely expressly
on RESTATEENT, ToRTs § 885 (1939), which not only refuses to recognize distinction
between "joint" and "concurrent' tortfeasors, id., comment c, but expressly affirms
"the tendency . . . to give effect to the intent of the parties to a transaction rather
than to regard as controlling the formalities with which the transaction is executed."
Ibid. And while the Restatement does distinguish between release and covenant, it
treats of both in terms of intent, not of inflexible rule of law: "A covenant not to
sue clearly indicates by its form that it is not intended to discharge the liability of
other tortfeasors jointly liable. On the other hand, a document in the usual form
of a release given to one of them is construed as intended to discharge all claims for
the tort and operates to discharge others also liable for the same harm. . . . Where
the discharge is by an oral agreement, the manifested intent of the parties controls."
Ibid. Such definition of release and covenant in terms of party intent may indicate
that the federal decisions are using the old linguistic categories as terminals of expression for conclusions based in fact on analyses of contractual intention. "The
language of the release is as general as language can be. There is nothing by which
it may be interpreted as a covenant not to sue. There is nothing which even hints
at a reservation of rights." Dura Elec. Lamp Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
sapra,at 7. In anti-trust conspiracy situations, where the parties are indeed very likely
to be thinking of claims as inseparably running against all of the co-conspirators, and
where releases are likely to be drawn by high-priced legal talent who are very aware
of what they want specifically to express, it is not at all unreasonable to conclude
that the releases involved in Durao, Solar, and Combinwd Bronx, though running in
terms only against the contracting tortfeasor, so manifestly demonstrated intent to
accept full satisfaction and relinquish all claims, as to deserve the summary judgment
treatment there accorded. In opposition to the doctrinal approach, there is the clear
language of McKenna. See note 20 supra. And see Carey v. Bilby, 129 Fed. 203
(8th Cir. 1904), for a holding of non-extinction in a case involving tortfeasors acting
in concert.
39. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 4 (1939). See 9 UNIFoRM L.
ANN. 242 (1957).
40. REsTAT mENT, TORTS §885(1), comment d (1939).
41. Compare Dura Elec. Lamp Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 249 F.2d 5
(3d Cir. 1957) ; Solar Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 156 F. Supp. 51 (W.D. Pa.
1957) ; Combined Bronx Amusements, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 132 F.
Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). wit McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir.
1943) ; Carey v. Bilby, 129 Fed. 203 (8th Cir. 1904) ; United States ex rel. Marcus
v. Hess, 60 F. Supp. 333 (W.D. Pa. 1945), aff'd per curiam, 154 F2d 291 (3d Cir.
1946). See discussion note 38 supra.
42. The authorities cited in note 41 supra, inasmuch as they appear to draw a
clear line of cleavage between cases of express reservation of rights by plaintiff and
cases of general release without such reservation, would seem to support railroaX's
motion for judgment noit obstante. To the extent that the instant case rejects that
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both on the grounds that generally plaintiffs settling with one tortfeasor do
not intend to prejudice their rights against others 4 and on the grounds that
it is more reasonable to place the burden of express provision upon tortfeasors, generally represented in negotiation by experienced agents or legal
counsel, than upon injured parties, often entirely ignorant of the law,"
nevertheless the language in the instant release relinquishing claims against
Warner "and all other persons, firms, and corporations" 4 would seem to
make erroneous a ruling that the release so unambiguously falls to express
intent to relieve railroad as to justify withdrawal of that issue from the
trier of the fact. It would seem that, in future cases of releases in like or
similar terms, the trial court should submit the issue.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE-DISTRICT CoURTs SPLIT oN APPLICATION OF AGRIcULTURAL

CoPzRTIVE ImmuITIES

TO M ONPOLY

PoHiBriIoNs oF THaE SHERmA2w ACT

Defendant, an agricultural cooperative association, having as members
nearly two thousand milk producers in Maryland and Virginia, acts as
marketing agent ' in the sale of milk to dealers in the Washington, D.C.
metropolitan area. In 1954 defendant acquired virtually all the assets of
the Embassy Dairy, a retail outlet for milk.2 As a result, ninety-one per
cent of the milk purchased by the federal government in the Washington,
D.C. market originated directly or indirectly from defendant, as against
forty-five per cent it had indirectly supplied previously. Civil action was
rule and relieves the injured party of the burden of specific provision, the decision
seems desirable. See notes 43, 44 infra and accompanying text. The case, in its
procedural framing, is precisely so limited: its wlding is only to overrule railroad's
motion for judgment non obstatte. As railroad did not predicate a motion for new
trial upon the court's failure to send the issue of the intendment of the release to the
jury, that question was not before the court See also notes 27, 28 and accompanying
text. The precedential danger of the case lies wholly in the doctrinal thrust of its
reasoning.
43. McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1943): "Ordinarily the
claimant will not secure complete indemnity from one or less than all, unless the
others are judgment proof. Such a settlement usually would not be advantageous
to the settling wrongdoer. The presumption of fact therefore generally would be
against full satisfaction and discharge."
44. PossER, ToRTs § 46, at 246 (2d ed. 1955).
45. Instant case at 348 n.l.
1. Defendant also owns a plant at which it transforms milk into various byproducts, such as ice cream, which are shipped to other markets., The net worth
of the corporation is about five million dollars. 167 F. Supp. at 48.
2. In 1927 defendant also purchased and acquired all of the outstanding capital
stock of the Richfield Dairy Corporation and Simpson Brothers, Inc., which together
operated the Wakefield Dairy. Ibid.
3. Before the acquisition, approximately 86% of all sales of fluid milk to dealers
in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area were made by defendant, and about 45%
of sales to federal establishments were made by dealers who procured their supply
from defendant. Embassy Dairy did not buy from defendant but procured its supply
from about 122 independent dairy farmers who, in turn, did not sell to defendant.
By cutting prices and frequently submitting bids lower than those of defendant's
dealer customers, Embassy was able to procure 4717 of all Government purchases,
as against 45% for dealers who purchased from defendant. 167 F. Supp. at 804.
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brought by the United States charging, inter alia,4 that defendant monopolized or attempted to monopolize interstate trade and commerce in
supplying milk for resale in and about the District of Columbia in violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Act.! Granting defendant's motion to dismiss,
the district court held that the immunities granted agricultural cooperatives
by section 6 of the Clayton Act O and section 1 of the Capper-Volstead
Act 7 exempt defendant entirely from the provisions of the antitrust laws,
both as to its existence and as to all of its activities, except where the
alleged activities are carried on in combination with persons not producers
of agricultural commodities. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk
ProducersAss'n, 167 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1958), petitions for cert. filed,
27 U.S.L. WEEK 3319, 3340 (U.S. May 8, 1959) (No. 898) (U.S. May
22, 1959) (No. 942).8
Shortly after the above decision, a treble damage action was brought
in the Massachusetts District Court against an agricultural cooperative,
similarly alleging, inter alia,9 violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
Relying on the Milk Producers Ass'n decision, defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was "wholly immune from suit where
there is no allegation of conspiracy with outsiders." 10 The court, denying
summary judgment, held that the statutory immunities were primarily
intended "to equate an agricultural cooperative and its members with an
individual business entity, as a lawful unit," 11 exempting cooperatives themselves from being held unlawful combinations or conspiracies in restraint of
trade, and that the immunity provisions of the Clayton and Capper-Volstead
Acts "at least did not make lawful purely predatory practices seeking to
4. The United States also alleged violation of §§ 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act
in that defendant conspired and combined to eliminate and foreclose competition in
the Washington metropolitan area by making and carrying out a contract for the
transfer to defendant of substantially all of the assets of the Embassy and RichfieldWakefield Dairies; and violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act in that the effect of
these acquisitions has been and may be to substantially lessen competition or to tend
to create a monopoly in the production and sale of milk to dealers in the Washington
metropolitan area. 167 F. Supp. at 47, 48. The court denied motions to dismiss as
to these causes of action. Id. at 53. The grounds for denial were that the allegations
involved combinations and conspiracies with persons other than agricultural producers
under the doctrine of U.S. v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
Subsequently, these
causes proceeded to trial. Defendant's acquisition of Embassy Dairy was found to
have been in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, but the acquisition of the RichfieldWakefield Dairies; and violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act in that the effect of
the brink of bankruptcy. 167 F. Supp. 799. The court also held the Embassy Dairy
acquisition to be in violation of §§ 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act. 168 F. Supp. 880.
5. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §2 (Supp. V, 1958).
6. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1952).
7. 42 Stat. 338 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §291 (1952).
8. Hereinafter referred to and cited as Milk Producers Ass'n.
9. Defendants were also charged with violating § 1 of the Sherman Act, 50 Stat.
693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V, 1958). April v. National Cranberry
Ass'n, 168 F. Supp. 919, 920 (D. Mass. 1959) (hereinafter referred to and cited as

April).

10. Id. at 920.
11. Id. at 922.
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monopolize, forbidden an individual corporation." 12 April v. National
Cranberry Ass'n, 168 F. Supp. 919 (D. Mass. 1958).
When farmers, who are usually sole proprietors owning and operating
their own businesses, began organizing and participating in cooperative
marketing associations they ran afoul in many instances of state antitrust
laws.' 3 While other business units were able to enlarge their competitive
bargaining position through use of the corporate form, farmers selling
their products at wholesale were forced to compete individually. To allow
farmers competitive advantages commensurate with those permitted ordinary business entities, 14 Congress provided by section 6 of the Clayton Act
that nothing in the antitrust laws shall "forbid the existence and operation
of . . . agricultural organizations," or forbid individual members "from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects" of such organizations; nor
could such organizations, or their members "be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade." 11 These immunities were further extended and clarified by the Capper-Volstead Act,
which declares that
"persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as
farmers . . . [or dairymen] may act together in associations . .

in collectively processing, preparing for market, handling and marketing . . . such products of persons so engaged.

Such associations

may have marketing agencies in common; and such associations and
their members may make the necessary contracts and agreements to
effect such purposes." '0
The precise limits of these enactments have never been clearly defined by
judicial decision.' 7 In United States v. Borden ' 8 the Supreme Court held
that the right of agricultural producers to unite or make contracts for the
marketing of their products "cannot be deemed to authorize any combination
or conspiracy with other persons in restraint of trade that these producers
may see fit to devise." 19 The case involved a conspiracy to fix prices in
12. Id. at 923.
13. See, e.g., Reeves v. Decorah Farmers' Co-op. Soc'y, 160 Iowa 194, 140 N.W.
844 (1913) ; Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Ass'n, 155 Ill. 166, 39 N.E. 651 (1895).
14. See generally, Gage, Some Problems of Farmers in, Fluid Milk Marketing,
7 KAN. L. REv. 311, 321 (1959); Hanna, Anti-Trust Immunities of Cooperative
Associations, 13 LAw & CONTEP. PROB. 488 (1948); Jensen, The Bill of Rights of
U.S. Cooperative Agriculture, 20 RocKY Mr. L. REv. 181, 184 (1948).
15. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1952).
16. 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §291 (1952).
17. It is, of course, clear that, at minimum, the Clayton Act recognizes as legal
the existence of agricultural cooperatives and that cooperative members cannot
be held, ipso facto, in unlawful combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. 38
Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §17 (1952). See United States v. Borden, 308 U.S.
188, 203-06 (1939) ; United States v. King, 250 Fed. 908 (D. Mass. 1916).
18. 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
19. Id. at 204-05. (Emphasis added.)
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violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,20 a milk producers' cooperative
acting in combination with non-producers---distributors and municipal officials. 21 While Borden makes clear that the immunity granted agricultural
cooperatives is in some manner circumscribed, the crucial issue presented
by the instant cases, whether a cooperative, qualified under the CapperVolstead Act 2 2 may, through predatory or other practices not undertaken
in concert with "other persons," acquire monopolistic control free from the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act, has neither been presented on appeal nor,
with one exception, 23 definitively decided at the trial court level. Prior to
Capper-Volstead it was declared by way of dictum in United States v.
King 2 4 that agricultural cooperatives are not, by virtue of the Clayton
immunity provisions, "privileged to adopt methods [in this case, secondary
boycott] of carrying on their business which are not permitted to other
lawful associations." 25 On the other hand, in United States v. Dairy
Co-op. Ass'n2 6 the Oregon District Court held that defendant could not be
prosecuted under an indictment charging monopolization in violation of the
Sherman Act.27 While the Capper-Volstead Act 28 does not. expressly
permit that monopolization may be achieved by the methods sanctioned
by its provisions, it was said by Judge Wyzanski in a carefully written
jury charge 2 that it would not be in violation of the antitrust laws for a
cooperative to acquire "even a 100% position in a market if it does it
solely through those steps which involve cooperative producing and
cooperative selling." 3 0 However, continued the charge,
20. 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §1 (Supp. V. 1958).
21. The "other persons" doctrine, however, was held by the same court that
decided Milk Prodixers Ass'n not to apply where two milk producers! cooperatives
conspired to fix prices for milk sold by their members to distributors. United States

v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1956),
105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 996 (1957). Borden was distinguished on the ground that it
involved a conspiracy between cooperative and non-cooperative entities.
22. 42 Stat 338 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1952). In order to acquire the privileges
granted by § 1 of the act, cooperatives must be "operated for the mutual benefit of
the members thereof, as such producers, and conform to one or both of the following
requirements: First. That no member of the association is allowed more than one
vote because of the amount of stock or membership capital he may own therein, or,
Second. That the association does not pay dividends on stock or membership capital
in excess of eight per centum per annum. And in any case the following: Third.
That the association shall not deal in the products of non-members to an amount
greater in value than such as are handled by it for members." Ibid.
23. See note 26 infra.
24. 250 Fed. 908 (D. Mass. 1916).
25. Id. at 910.
26. 49 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1943).
27. The court seemed principally concerned with criticizing what it regarded as
a then current judicial hostility toward labor legislation, the immunities of the Clayton
Act being likewise applicable to labor organizations. Ibid.
28. 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §291 (1952).
29. Cape Cod Food Prod., Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900,
907 (D. Mass. 1954).
30. Ibid.
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to secure a dominant share of the market through a restraint of trade
which was prohibited, or through a predatory device, or through the
bad faith use of otherwise legitimate devices." 31
The court in Milk Producers Ass'n, rejecting the government's distinction
between different types of activities along the lines of the Wyzanski charge,
held that there was "no basis for separating unreasonable restraints of trade
that would otherwise come within the provisions of the antitrust laws into
two categories and concluding that some come within the exception and
others do not." 3 2 The court concluded that since the Clayton Act 4
exempts cooperatives both as to their "existence" and "operation," with
the sole exception of those cases fitting within the Borden doctrine,34
"an agricultural cooperative is entirely exempt from the provisions of the
antitrust laws both as to its very existence as well as to all of its
activities." 35 The April court, however, relying heavily oil the respective
congressional histories of the two exemptive provisions,36 and on the fact
that section 6 of the Clayton Act provides that a cooperative and its members are not to be prohibited "from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects" 3 7 of the association,3 impliedly accepted the Wyzanski distinction
and ruled that "purely predatory practices seeking to monopolize" were
subject to civil and criminal action under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.3 9
It is apparent that the distinction set out in the Wyzanski charge 4 0
not only supports the decision in April as defining the proper limits of
agricultural cooperative immunity under the antitrust laws, but is itself
supported both by the statutory scheme and language, and by the policy
considerations which prompted enactment of the exemptive provisions.
It is clear from the legislative history 41 that Congress' original purpose in
granting the initial Clayton exemptions-to put the individual producer on
an equal footing with competing segments of society by recognizing the
existence and operation of associations organized for mutual self-help 4 2 was not altered by the extension and clarification of those immunities by
the Capper-Volstead Act. It is suggested, rather, that section 1 of that
31. This position is accepted by ATT'Y
(1955).

GEN. NATL CoM. ANTiTRUSt REP. 309-10

32. Milk Producers Ass'n at 51.

33. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §17 (1952).
34. United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 204 (1939).
and accompanying text.
35. Milk Producers Ass'n at 52.
36. April at 921-23. See notes 55 and 60 infra.

37. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1952).

See notes 18-21 supra

(Emphasis added.)

38. April at 923.
39. Ibid.
40. See text accompanying notes 30, 31 supra.

41. See, e.g., H.R REP. No. 24, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1921).
42. Ibid. See also note 14 .supra.

1959]

RECENT CASES

act embodies a congressional recognition that in order to achieve equality
of bargaining power, cooperatives must be permitted to seek monopolistic
control through the voluntary accession to membership of producers in a
given area. Several factors point to the soundness of this interpretation.
First, it would seem that Congress, in enumerating a battery of permissible
cooperative activities which, in fact, are those activities normally carried
on by such associations, has likewise sanctioned the fulfillment of the
ultimate purpose of cooperative associations-the organization of all the
producers of a commodity into a collective association in order to increase
the profits of individual producers through collective marketing.4 Second,
the acquisition of monopoly power by means of the permitted collective
activities seems analogous to those situations where monopoly has been
"thrust upon" 44 a corporation which, as a result, has been held outside the
purview of the Sherman Act.4 While the circumstances which will sustain
the "thrust upon" defense in the case of business associations 46 are not
present in the instant situations, it would seem that Congress, by sanctioning agreements and common agencies to effectuate collective marketing,
has itself established a situation in which monopolization will be "thrust
upon" cooperatives who take advantage of the Capper-Volstead provisions.
Third, the acquisition of "even a 100 percent" 47 position in the market
will not, under the restrictions set out in section 2 of Capper-Volstead,
be injurious to the public. By that section Congress has indicated the
limits which cooperatives may not transgress in their acquisition of complete
market control. It is provided that "if the Secretary of Agriculture shall
have reason to believe that any such association monopolizes or restrains
trade . . . to such an extent that the price of any agriculturalproduct is
unduly enhanced by reason thereof' the Secretary may issue a judicially
enforceable cease and desist order.4 8 Monopolization is thus proscribed
only when it effects the specified evil of undue price enhancement; Congress,
then, has acted to define expressly what it considers to be reasonable restraint of trade and monopolization within the bounds of permitted
49
activity.
43. See generally Note, 44 VA. L. REv. 63, 83 n.101 (1958); Mischler, Agricultural Cooperative Law, 30 RocKy MT. L. RE~v. 381 (1958).
44. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.7d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
45. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
46. Ibid. E.g., demand so limited that only one manufacturer can economically
supply; changes in cost or taste driving out all but one supplier; survival by virtue
of superior skill and foresight. See Ar'Y Gzx. NATL COMM. ANTIUST REP. 56-57

(1955).
47. Cape Cod Food Prod., Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900,
907 (D. Mass. 1954). See text accompanying notes 29, 30 supra.
48. 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §292 (1952), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §292
(Supp. V, 1958). (Emphasis added.)
49. Support for this view is found in United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188
(1939) : 'We think that the procedure under section 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act is
auxiliary and was intended merely as a qualification of the authorization given to
cooperative agricultural producers by § 1 . . ." Id. at 206.
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The instant cases did not involve charges of monopolization as a result
of the exercise of Capper-Volstead activity. The complaints in both instances alleged predatory practices in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act. 60 In Milk Producers Ass'n those practices were principally related to
the acquisition of the assets of Embassy Dairy, a retail milk distributor
which was the association's only substantial competitor in sales to the
federal government. 51 By its purchase of Embassy, defendant brought
within its control those independent producers who had previously sold
their products to Embassy, thus achieving monopoly position by means of
an outright purchase of control over those producers who had not been
willing to join the association in the first place. The concept of voluntary
association contemplated by the Capper-Volstead Act does not extend to the

involuntary impressing of producers into membership by acquisition of the
chief means by which those producers may independently sell their produce.
It would seem, as the Wyzanski charge 52 implies, that a distinction should
be drawn between the existence of monopoly power and the means by
which monopoly is achieved, and that when a dominant share of the market
is sought or secured through devices not sanctioned by Capper-Volstead,
cooperatives should be subject to the same prohibitions to which other
business associations are subject. In conjunction with this analysis, the
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture should be restricted to those
instances where authorized collective action results in undue enhancement
of prices. Overruling a district court holding that the Secretary has
primary and exclusive jurisdiction over all cooperative antitrust violations,
the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Borden found "no ground for saying that
this limited procedure is a substitute for the provisions of the Sherman
Act." 44 While Borden did not involve a charge of monopolization on the
part of the individual defendant, the decision at least establishes that
Capper-Volstead sanctions were not intended as a substitute for the en55
To limit the
forcement provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
50. April at 920; Milk ProducersAss'n at 47. In Milk Producers Ass'n, defendants were charged with exclusion of non-member producers supplying milk to distributors, threats and inducements in acquiring distributing and processing outlets,
inducing and compelling distributors to purchase milk from defendant, predatory
pricing, discrimination, and seeking action by government agencies to eliminate competition. Amended Complaint, United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers
Ass'n, Civil No. 4482-56, D.D.C., Feb. 7, 1957. See Note, 44 VA. L. REv. 63, 83
n.112 (1958).
51. See note 3 supra.
52. Cape Cod Food Prod., Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 900,
907 (D. Mass. 1954). See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
53. 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
54. Id. at 206.
55. While the legislative history of the Capper-Volstead Act indicates that § 2
was a compromise measure, and that there was some feeling in Congress that cooperatives should be completely immune from prosecution or suit for monopolistic practices,
the reasoning of the April court seems, on the whole, the better view. An amendment
was reported out by the House Committee on the Judiciary which would have substituted for the present § 2 of the Capper-Volstead Act, a provision explicitly making
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Borden holding to those situations where cooperatives act in combination
with "other persons," 5 6 as did the court in Milk Producers Ass'n, is in
accord neither with the scheme of the immunity provisions nor with the
clear implications of the Borden decision.T Further support for the
proposition that when cooperatives step beyond bounds of authorized
collective activity they are subject to civil and criminal action under the
Clayton and Sherman Acts is found in the language of the Clayton exemption. The fact that cooperative members are not forbidden or restrained
s
"from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects" of the association6
implies that section 6 was not intended to permit carte blanche violation of
the antitrust laws. As the court in Milk Producers Ass'n recognized, the
extension of immunity to predatory and coercive practices may create
"serious dangers lurking to the public weal." 59 Interpretation of the
exemptive provisions in accord with April and the Wyzanski charge will
better serve to fulfill the purposes of immunity, while providing maximum
protection for the public. °
applicable to the cooperatives all laws prohibiting monopolization. This amendment
was rejected. 62 CONG. Rm 2281 (1922). In debate subsequent to the filing of the
amendment, it appears that the principal harm feared from monopoly was injury to
the public in the form of enhancement of prices. Other points expressed in debate
were that farmers would usually be prevented by the workings of economic laws
from achieving monopoly (62 CONG. Rc. 2059 (1922)); that the possibility of
monopoly in a few particular instances should not be permitted to outweigh the
general benefits of the act (id. at 2053) ; and that if agriculturalists could be prosecuted
for monopolizing, every local U.S. Attorney would be on their trail (id. at 2050).
Congress then passed § 2 of the act, providing for action by the Secretary of Agriculture where monopoly results in undue enhancement of prices. The April court
concluded that this did not foreclose the question of whether the Government or a
private individual could maintain action against an agricultural cooperative on a
charge of monopoly, because neither the debates nor the act mentions "injury which
would result to competitors of a cooperative if it engaged in predatory practices
against them for the purpose of achieving a monopoly." April at 922. The court
conceded that it was possible to infer that the proceedings which could be initiated
by the Secretary of Agriculture were intended to be the exclusive governmental
remedy, within limits such as those set forth under the Borden decision. The court
held, however, that to take away the right to maintain a private suit would permit
cooperatives to use unfair methods to put competitors out of business, a result which
would be out of harmony with the purpose of the act. See note 60 infra.
56. See United States v. Borden. 308 U.S. 188, 204 (1939). See also text
accompanying notes 18-21 .mpra.
57. Ibid.
58. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §17 (1952).
59. Milk ProducersAss'n at 52.
60. This conclusion was well expressed in a House report on the Capper-Volstead
Act: 'While this bill confers on farmers certain privileges, it cannot properly be said
to be class legislation. Business corporations have under existing law all the powers
and privileges sought to be conferred on farm organizations by this bill. . . . [I]t
aims to equalize existing privileges by changing the law applicable to the ordinary
business corporations so the farmers can take advantage of it. . . . In the event
that associations authorized by this bill shall do anything forbidden by the Sherman
Antitrust Act they will be subject to the penalties imposed by the law. It is not
sought to place these associations above the law, but to grant to them the same
immunity from prosecution that corporations now enjoy so that they may be able
to do business successfully in competition with them." H.R. REP. No. 24, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 (1921).
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TION OF COLLATERAL UNDER UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

Debtor lessee executed a security agreement to petitioner landlord
covering his office, laboratory and plant equipment in consideration for
an accumulation of past due rent.1 Simultaneously, a judgment note in
the amount of $7,600 was executed and delivered as evidence of the debt,
and judgment of record was immediately entered. Six months later,
there was a default under the security agreement by reason of non-payment
of current rent. The secured party caused execution to issue and levied on
all the personal property of the debtor covered by the agreement, 2 but before
the sheriff's sale a voluntary petition in bankruptcy was filed and stay of
the sale ordered by the district court.3 Petitioner then filed a reclamation
petition seeking recovery from the receiver all the secured tangible assets
of the debtor. On certificate for review of the referee's order dismissing
the reclamation petition, 4 the district court affirmed, holding that, although
the remedies on default under section 9-501 of the Uniform Commercial
Code 3 as enacted in Pennsylvania are cumulative, the secured party may
utilize more than one only if they are consistent. In the Matter of Adrian
Research & Chem. Co., 169 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
In an effort to attain simplicity, certainty, flexibility and uniformity
in commercial transactions,O Pennsylvania in 1954 discarded its old security
structure 7 and adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.8 Article 9, the
1. The security agreement was duly recorded in the county wherein the property
was located and in the office of the secretary of the Commonwealth in conformity
with the requirements of § 9-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code, PA. STAT. ANN;
tit. 12A, §9-401 (1954).
2. The levy was made on all the property on the leased premises. Employees' personal property was allowed to be replevied without contest. Accounts receivable
were not attached. Interview With Mr. John Landis, Attorney for the Secured
Party, in Lansdale, Pa., April 11, 1959. A comparison of the auctioneer's sale list
and the security agreement indicates that, with the exception of a few minor items,
all the property sold was either explicitly covered by the agreement or was included
under a catch-all clause.
3. The bankruptcy petition was filed on March 27, 1958, and stay of the sale was
ordered on March 30, 1958. Execution on the judgment entered Sept. 12, 1957,
occurred on March 12, 1958, fifteen days prior to the bankruptcy petition.
4. Opinion and Order Sur Reclamation Petition of William M. Kirkpatrick by
Bertram Wolfe, Referee in Bankruptcy, quoted in Brief for Appellant, In the Matter
of Adrian Research & Chem. Co., No. 12847, in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit The equipment was later sold by stipulation and the petitioner
was relegated to the fund received ($2,035.88), if and when his claim was allowed.
5. UCC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-501 (1954).
6. See UCC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-102 and comments (1954).
7. Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, Pennsylvania
chattel security law comprised an amalgamation of various statutes and court decisions, fashioned or revised at different times as the need for new types of secured
financing arose. Rights and duties of the parties depended on the law of the particular
device selected; regardless of the objective of the transaction, its form was generally
determinative. See Schwartz, Pennsylvania Chattel Security and the Uniform. Comninercial Code, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 530 (1950). The principal security devices recognized in Pennsylvania were the bailment lease, the conditional sale, the chattel mortgage, the trust receipt, and the factor's lien.
8. UCC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (1954). The Code became effective on July 1,
1954.
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"Secured Transactions" part of the Code, represents a novel and forward
approach 9 to chattel security, in which title and lien theories for determining rights are discarded '0 and other distinctions based on form are
abandoned in favor of differences in treatment based functionally upon the
type of collateral secured."- In place of the various recognized pre-Code
security devices, the UCC substitutes the comprehensive security agreement.1 2 Alternative courses of action available to a secured party upon
default by the debtor are indexed in section 9-501, which, in part, provides
that:
"(1) When a debtor is in default under the security agreement
a secured party may reduce his claim to judgment. .

.

. If the

collateral is goods he may in addition do one or more of the following . . .: (a) foreclose the security interest by any available judicial
procedure; (b) take possession of the collateral under Section 9-503.

The court in the instant case held that, as the Chattel Mortgage Act ' 4 was
specifically repealed by the Code,' 6 there is no longer in Pennsylvania
"any available judicial procedure" to foreclose a security interest asserted
against personal property. 1 In the court's view, availability of subsection
9-501(1) (a) of the UCC depends upon whether an enacting state has
an existing independent procedure denominated "foreclosure" which would
make the subsection operative. It advanced as justification for this position
the rationale that the Code had been drafted for adoption in all states and
that, *among these, some jurisdictions might well have such specific procedure for foreclosure.'1 A measure of support for the court may be
9. See Countryman, The Secured Transaction Article of the Commercial Code
LAw & CONTEMP. POB. 76 (1951) ; Gilmore,
The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CoNTEMP.
PRoB. 27 (1951); Gilmore, The Uniformi Connercial Code: A Reply to Professor
Beutel, 61 YALE LJ. 363 (1952).
10. See UCC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §9-202 (1954), quoted in text accompanying note 53 infra. Cf. Richter, Commercial Code, Article 9, A Round-Up, 7 Q.
REPoRT, CONFEPENCE ox PERSONAL Fix. L. 36-39 (1953). Title may still be important
in determining tax consequences.
11. See the comments accompanying § 9-102, UCC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A,
§ 9-102 (1954). See also Gilmore, Rights on Defaudt, 7 Q. REPoRr, CONFERENCE oN
PERsoNAL FIN. L. 4 (1952).
12. A security agreement is defined in § 9-105 (h) as "an agreement which creates
or provides for a security interest. . . ." Security interest is defined in § 1-201(37)
as "an interest in property which secures payment or performance of an obligation."
13. UCC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-501 (1954). The draftsmen of the Code
have proposed changes in 1955, 1957, and 1958. Although a bill to adopt the 1955
proposed revisions was introduced in the Pennsylvania legislature it died in the
Senate. A bill to incorporate the 1957 changes has been introduced in the current
legislature.
14. Pa. Laws 1945, 1358, § 1 (contained in Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 940.1 (Supp.

atd Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16

1952)).

15. UCC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 10-102 (1954).
16. Instant case at 359.
17. Ibid.
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derived from the explanation given by the draftsmen of the 1955 revisions
who proposed a supplementary optional subsection to section 9-501 which
explicitly provided that execution and levy on a judgment constitutes
"foreclosure"::"8 the draftsmen noted that there was some doubt whether
any procedure to foreclose a security interest was available in a number
of states. 19 But equally strong argument can be made for the contrary
view that the framers intended foreclosure to have a meaning independent of
separate state statutory schemes, and that addition of the words "any available judicial procedure" represents merely an express sanction for provision
of more than one method of implementing the given remedy. This position
was expressly adopted by the draftsmen in the text and comments of the
1957 official draft of the Code. 20 Had the framers of the 1952 Code, now
in effect in Pennsylvania, intended the use of a provision as important as
this to be optional, it seems unlikely that they would have deviated from
the practice otherwise followed throughout the Code of specifically indicating optional provisions and of spelling out the options. 2 1 And if, as the
court says, the provision is not self-operative, it is difficult to see why,
without contemporary provision for some other, separately codified foreclosure procedure, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the subsection at

all. In as much as the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act 2 2 requires
all statutory provisions to be given effect, it would appear that 9-501 (1) (a)
must have meaning independent of the existence of a separate enactment
providing procedure whereby a security interest may be foreclosed. As the
heart of any security agreement is the ability of the secured party to
reach the collateral in the event of default s3 it is improbable especially in
view of the explicitly cumulative battery of remedies in 9-501, that the
draftsmen intended to provide only one safe method of reaching that
collateral-taking possession under 9-503.24 Foreclosure is a faster and less
18. UCC § 9-501(5) (Revisions, Supplement No. 1 to 1952 Official Draft, Jan.
1955).
19. See Reason, UCC §9-501(5) (Revisions, Supplement No. 1 to 1952 Official
Draft, Jan. 1955). See UCC §9-501(5) and comments (Official Draft, 1957).
20. UCC §9-501(5) (Official Draft, 1957).
21. See, e.g., UCC §§9-203, 9-302, 9-401 (Official Draft, 1952).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§501-602 (1952).
23. See Gilmore, Rights on Default, 7 Q. REPORT, CONFmmRCE ON PERSoNAL
FIN. L. 4 (1952).

24. In some cases, even physical possession will not assure the secured party
that he can himself sell the goods and keep the proceeds. In case of bankruptcy of
the debtor, for example, if the security agreement were fraudulent, or filed less than
four months prior to bankruptcy, or in certain highly unusual factual situations (see
Matter of Einhorn Bros., Inc., No. 25233, E.D. Pa., March 23, 1959), the bankruptcy
court could invalidate the original security interest created by the filing of the agreement. And even where there is no cause to invalidate the security interest, the bankruptcy court could, as it did in the instant case, force the secured party to allow the
receiver to conduct the sale of the collateral, either because the secured party threatened
to dispose of it in a "commercially unreasonable manner," (see UCC § 9-507 and
comments) or if it believed that a better price could be obtained by selling all the
assets at one time instead of piecemeal. In this situation, of course, the secured
party would still be entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the collateral, up to the
amount of the debt. See Gilmore, supra note 23.
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expensive method of realizing on collateral when the debtor refuses to allow
the secured party to take possession or threatens to dispose of the
property; 25 to allow the secured party to choose this simple and easy
remedy as well as that of taking possession would seem necessary if the
courts are to carry out one of the main objectives of the Code, that of
reducing the high cost of credit by making the rights of secured parties
more certain 26 Furthermore, the desired UCC goal of uniform interpretation would be fostered by having at least one recognized procedure for
implementing the remedy of 9-501 (1) (a) in every state which adopts the
Code.
If the word "foreclose" must have some meaning, then, there arises
the issue of what meaning is to be assigned to it under the Pennsylvania
enactment. Nowhere in the Code is "foreclose" defined, nor do the
comments to the 1952 official draft2 indicate for what purpose it was
inserted by the framers. Some terms common in commercial law were
expressly defined in the UCC2 8 and although others were not, when any
term was intended to be given a special meaning in the operation of the
Code, the framers were assiduous in indicating what that special meaning
was.P It seems reasonable to say, therefore, that, when they did not
define "foreclose," the draftsmen intended that it would retain the patina
of meaning that it had previously acquired in the law of chattel security.
The Pennsylvania Chattel Mortgage Act5 o had provided for foreclosure
as one of the remedies available to secured parties on default. Section
940.15 stated that:
"Upon default by the mortgagor in the payment of the mortgage
debt, either as to principal or interest, or upon default in the performance of any covenant contained in the chattel mortgage or bond or
note, the chattel mortgage may be foreclosed by any of the methods
authorized by law for the foreclosure of the mortgage, including the
entry of judgment on the bond or note secured by the chattel mortgage.
The lien or any levy which may be made upon the mortgaged property
by virtue of any execution based upon a judgment entered upon such
25. See note 26 infra.
26. If the secured party vants to take possession he is forced to sue out a writ
of replevin and post a replevin bond. This in itself is time consuming and even if
the secured party prevails the sale will take more time. Taking possession may
involve the expense of hauling the collateral to a warehouse and storing it until a
sale can be arranged. If the collateral is inventory and is left on the premises of
the debtor there is always the danger of a sale to a buyer in the ordinary course of
business, who will take free of the security interest, under § 9-307, or that the debtor
will otherwise unlawfully dispose of the collateral.
27. UCC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (1954).
28. E.g., contract, § 1-201(11); creditor, § 1-201(12) ; holder, § 1-201(20). See
also §§9-105(1) (c), (d), (f).
29. E.g., creditor, § 1-201 (12); good faith, § 1-201(19); purchase money security
interest, § 9-107.
30. Pa. Laws 1945, 1358, § 1 (formerly Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 940.1 (Supp.
1952)).
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bond or note shall relate back to the date of filing of the chattel
mortgage ..

. , 31

Thus, upon a showing of default, the secured party could cause execution to
issue on the judgment, and could have the sheriff levy on the particular
collateral secured; judicial sale and disposition of the proceeds would
follow.3 2

Foreclosure differed from the contract remedy of suit for the

obligation in two respects: in foreclosure, the execution and levy was
restricted to the particular collateral secured, as opposed to levy on any or
all of the debtor's assets; also, by relation back of the time of transfer,
the action of foreclosure was saved from being voided as a preference s3
if bankruptcy ensued within four months of the levy,3 4 whereas on a normal
execution on a judgment there was no relation back, and no lien was
created until the date of execution.35 Thus, whether the action by the
secured party be called foreclosure or merely execution and levy on a
judgment makes the major difference in his rights to the collateral upon
bankruptcy of the debtor. The court concluded that because of the
specific repeal of the Chattel Mortgage Act by section 10-102 of the Code,'3
the execution and levy by the secured party was not foreclosure.37 However, there is no difference between foreclosure as formally defined in
the previous statute and what the secured party did in the instant case.
The execution and levy was restricted to the particular collateral-the
plant, office and laboratory equipment of the debtor-covered by the
agreement; 38 the debtor's accounts receivable were left untouched. There
was no attempt to reach assets which were not encumbered, and therefore
the particular action left undiminished the expectations of unsecured
creditors and did not transfer a greater proportion of the debtor's assets to
the secured party than he was entitled to realize under the agreement. Had
the initial action been taken in form pursuant to section 9-503,39 the very
goods levied upon would have quite properly been turned over to the
31. Pa. Laws 1945, 1358, § 15 (formerly Pa. Stat Ann. tit. 21, § 940.15 (Supp.
1952)). (Emphasis added.)
32. Ibid. "In such foreclosure proceedings the mortgaged chattels may be sold
in the same manner as authorized by the laws of this Commonwealth in the case of
personal property sold under execution." When the writ was given to the sheriff,
the attorney for the secured party attached a form on which the property to be levied
upon was designated.
33. If the mortgage was not filed more than four months prior to bankruptcy,
this relation back, of course, did not aid the secured party, whether or not the subsequent procedure was foreclosure.
34. 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1952).
35. In Pennsylvania, a judgment does not create a lien on personal property.
The lien dates from the execution and levy and thus there is no relation back. See
AmRAm, CoMoN PLEAs PRAcTIcE 282-388 (6th ed. 1954).
36. UCC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 10-102 (1954).
37. Instant case at 359.
38. See note 2 supra.
39. UCC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-503 (1954). Taking possession would
have related back to the time of perfection of the security interest.
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secured party 4 0 In view of the practical equivalence of the procedures, it
is to place an undue emphasis on words to hold that execution and levy,
where restricted to the particular collateral secured, is not foreclosure.
Section 1-102 41 specifically provides that text language is to be liberally
construed to effectuate the Code's underlying purposes, and section 1-106 42
further provides that "remedies [are to] be liberally administered to the
end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other
party had fully performed. . .

."

Thus, both the language and the basic

purposes and the objectives of the Code support the argument that 9-501
(1) (a), of itself and independently of any extrinsic statutory provision for
foreclosure, operates to give the holder of a secured interest an effective
right to foreclose, and that "foreclose" is intended to have the same meaning it had in previous law.4 Since the landlord's interest, then, relates back
to the date of filing of the security agreement, more than four months
prior to the lessee's bankruptcy, the above analysis seems to require that
the court's decision be reversed.
But if it be determined that 9-501(1) (a) in fact has no meaning in
Pennsylvania, or that "foreclose," as used in that section, has not the
meaning assigned above," still the instant decision appears incorrect. The
doctrine of election of remedies as applied by the court proceeds on the
40. The court admitted that the 1957 official draft would change the result in
the instant case but stated without discussion that the proposed changes of the draftsmen were "amending" and not "clarifying." Instant case at 359-60.
41. UCC, PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 12A, § 1-102 (1954).
42. UCC, PA. STAT. Ar. tit. 12A, § 1-106 (1954).
43. Nor does examination of prior drafts of the Code compel a contrary conclusion. In the earlier editions of the Code, separate provisions covering default
were included in the parts of article 9 (then article 8) pertaining to the different
types of collateral. In the case of "equipment," repossession was the only remedy
provided. UCC § 7-323 (Draft, May, 1949). The September 1949 revisions, however, radically altered the basic framework of article 9 and a separate part of the
article was devoted to default. A specific section concerning taking possession was
added (§ 8-603, now § 9-503) and the words "foreclose by any available judicial
procedure" made their first appearance. UCC § 8-601 (Revisions, Sept. 1949). It
was not until the June 1951 revisions that the wording of § 9-501 as enacted in
Pennsylvania was finalized. It seems significant that subsections (a) and (b) were
transposed so that the first remedy listed is foreclosure.
Section 9-102(h) specifically approves use of the comments as aids in clarifying
and amplifying the text, but subsection (g) takes the novel approach of barring the
use of past drafts in "ascertaining legislative intent." There is, in any event, some
question whether there exists, as to the UCC, any "legislative intent" in the normal
sense of the term. The Pennsylvania Legislature considered and enacted the Code,
but it was drafted exclusively by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Use of past drafts to establish
the intent of the draftsmen, and the development of the sections and resolution of
problems might be deemed to escape this statutory ban and would certainly constitute a helpful source of material in construing the present text. One writer has
termed this ban "obviously precatory." Braucher, Tire 1956 Revisi.o of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 2 VILL. L. Rxv. 3, 7 (1956). Later revisions of the Code have
dropped all reference to the comments and the past drafts. For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the Code see Braucher, The Legislative History of
the Uniform Comnvercial Code, 58 COLuJm. L. Ray. 798, 808-14 (1958).
44. See text and notes accompanying notes 27-43 =spra.
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theory that, although the remedies of 9-501 are cumulative,4 pursuit of
more than one must be "consistent." Having once chosen a remedy that
affirms title in the goods either in the secured party or the debtor, one
cannot thereafter proceed to assert an inconsistent and irreconcilable claim
of right.4 But, while execution and levy implies that title to the collateral
remains in the debtor, 47 attempt to take possession under 9-503 asserts
instead an ownership right in the secured party; 48 consequently the
remedies are inconsistent, and pursuit of one is a bar to the other. The
court supported this result upon authority of two pre-Code federal cases
49
concerning bailment leases and conditional sales under Pennsylvania law,
both of which applied the election of remedies doctrine on the basis of
affirmation of title inherent in the initial action of the secured party; and,
if that doctrine is applicable in the present case, those decisions should
indeed be controlling. However, one of the principal objectives of the UCC
was precisely to avoid the uncertainty which the election doctrine had
created5o by making mutually restrictive remedies alternatively available
to a secured party on default. Functional rather than formal distinctions
were the base upon which the rights of secured parties were to be
grounded.5 1 To attain this goal, the Code has made explicit its position
that questions of title do not control. The comments to the introductory
section of article 9 state: "This article does not determine whether a
secured party has 'title' to the collateral or whether 'title' is in the debtor.
[A] nd neither a 'title theory' nor a 'lien theory' is adopted." 52
.
Again, section 9-202: "Each provision of this Article with regard to rights,
obligations, and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the secured
party or in the debtor." '3
Under the Code, then, an assertion of a right to possession under
section 9-503, or of a right to foreclose under section 9-501(1) (a), if
any there be in the jurisdiction, is made irrespective of the location of title.
Successive use of remedies granted by the Code would therefore seem
beyond election-of-remedies attack on grounds of inconsistency of assertion
of title in two actions by the secured party. But, even if the execution and
*

45. Section 9-501 provides: "When a debtor is in default under the security agreement a secured party may reduce his claim to judgment . . . . If the collateral is
(Emphasis
"
goods, he may in addition do onw or nwre of the following ....
added.)
46. See Kelley Springdale Road Roller Co. v. Schlimme, 230 Pa. 413, 69 AtI.
867 (1908) and cases cited therein.
47. The court cites In re Fitzpatrick, 1 F.2d 445 (W.D. Pa. 1923), where election
was found in a proceeding to judgment for the full amount of the obligation on a
note accompanying a bailment lease.
48. The court so reasons upon authority of In re Elkins, 38 F. Supp. 250, 252
(E.D. Pa. 1941).
49. Instant case at 359. See cases cited notes 47, 48 supra.
50. E.g., In re Fitzpatrick, 1 F.2d 445 (W.D. Pa. 1923) (bailment lease); In re
Elkins, 38 F. Supp. 250 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (conditional sale).
51. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
52. UCC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-101 with comment (1954).
53. UCC, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-202 (1954).

1959]

RECENT CASES

levy in the instant case be considered the exercise of a contract remedy as
distinguished from a remedy within the scope of the Code, 4 and a remedy
which in fact affirms title to the property in the debtor, still the election
doctrine should not bar the right to take possession under 9-503, for this
right is available no matter where title to the goods lies, and can consequently imply neither affirmance nor disaffirmance of that title. There is
nothing inherent in execution and levy that gives inference of waiver of
the remedies in the Code, nor do any policy considerations urge denial of
a right that the secured party had obtained by entire prior compliance with
the UCC recording provisions. 55 Invocation of the election of remedies
doctrine therefore seems inappropriate in the instant case. The 9-503 Code
remedy remains available for vindication of the landlord's interest, secured
by filing well before the four month cut-off date, and the court should have
granted the petition for reclamation.

WILLS-PROBATE DENIED HUSBAND'S WILL WHEN HUSBAND AND
WIFE EACH MISTAKENLY SIGNED THE OTHER'S MUTUAL WILL
Husband and wife by mistake each signed the other's will. The wills
had been drawn pursuant to a common scheme and were reciprocal, each
instrument giving the entire estate of the testator or testatrix, respectively,
to the named spouse and providing, if the named spouse should predecease
the testator or testatrix, for the gift over, after two small specific precuniary
bequests, of all the residue to Elias Martin, the wife's brother. Wife died
before husband, but the will she signed was never offered for probate. Upon
the death of husband, Martin offered for probate as husband's will the
paper which had been drafted for wife's signature but actually signed by
husband. Probate was refused. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that the Wills Act 1 prohibited acceptance of
the instrument. To allow Martin's claim, the court said, would require
that almost the entire will be rewritten by appropriate substitution throughout of the husband's name for the wife's, the wife's name for the husband's,
"my wife" for "my husband," and, in place of "my brother, Elias Martin,"
a phrase describing Martin's proper relationship to husband. The language as it stood was held to be "unambiguous, clear, and unmistakable,"
and, in view of its purport as wife's, not husband's will, "a meaningless
nullity." In re Estate of Pavlinko, 394 Pa. 564, 148 A.2d 528 (1959).
54. There are some indications that the instant court so analyzed this case, but
there is no explicit statement to this effect. See instant case at 359.
55. See note 1 supra.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.2 (1950): "Every will . . . shall be in writing
and shall be signed by the testator at the end thereof. .. ."
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In the few cases that have arisen, American courts 2 and commentators 3 have uniformly ruled "that where the testator intended to
execute his will, but by mistake signed the wrong document, the latter
should be denied probate." 4 The instant case is typical: mutual wills are
executed, each testator signing the wrong instrument. The paper usually
offered for probate is that signed by the alleged testator, as in the instant
case. A leading New York case ' held that such a paper could not be
probated as the husband's will since, in mistakenly signing the instrument
prepared for his wife, he had not in fact signed the paper which he intended
to be his will. The court recognized a twofold problem; first, admissibility
of the instrument to probate, and, second, once probate granted, construction of the will. Having refused probate, the New York court felt
no need to discuss construction. However, the leading Pennsylvania case
on mis-signed mutual wills, Alter's Appeal,7 dealt with the other instrument: that prepared for the would-be testator and which he had intended
to sign, but which had in fact been signed by his wife. The prayer was
to strike the wife's signature and substitute the husband's. The court,
dismissing, held that the paper offered had not been "signed" by the
testator as required by the Wills Act. By way of dictum, the court
added that, were the other paper offered, it too would be denied probate.
This court, too, recognized the dual problem of probate and construction
and thought that it had no need to discuss the latter. The instant court said
that Alter was "directly on point," 8 despite the fact that the instrument
now before it for probate as husband's will was not the paper signed by the
wife, as in Alter, but the one actually signed by husband. There appears
no recognition on the part of the instant court that probate and construction
are distinct problems; rather, one of the court's reasons for denying probate
is the presumed difficulty of construction. 9
In contrast to these unwavering American decisions stand three mutual
wills cases decided recently in the British Commonwealth."0 A New
Zealand court,"' recognizing in a case where two sisters had inadvertently
signed each other's wills, that the real hurdle was admissibility to probate,
specifically rejected the contention that "the testatrix did not intend to sign
this document and that this document was never intended by her . . .
2. Nelson v. McDonald, 61 Hun. 406, 16 N.Y. Supp. 273 (Sup. Ct. 1891) ; In re
Cutler's Will, 58 N.Y.S2d 604 (Surr. Ct. 1945); In re Bacon's Will, 165 Misc. 259,
300 N.Y. Supp. 920 (Surr. Ct. 1937); Alter's Appeal, 67 Pa. 341 (1871).
3. ATxiNsoN, Wn.Ls § 58 (3d ed. 1953).
4. Ibid.
5. Such was the situation in the three New York cases cited note 2 supra.
6. Nelson v. McDonald, 61 Hun. 406, 16 N.Y. Supp. 273 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
7. Alter's Appeal, 67 Pa. 341 (1871).
8. Instant case at 567, 148 A.2d at 529.
9. Ibid.
10. Re Brander, 6 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 702, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 688 (1952);
Re Duck, Vancouver Registry #51005/53 (Sup. Ct. B.C. 1953); Guardian Trust,
Ltd. v. Inwood, [1946] N.Z.L.R. 614 (1946).
11. Guardian Trust, Ltd. v. Inwood, supra note 10.
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to be her will" as "a very technical basis for its rejection. . . . There is
no doubt that she intended the document to which she put her signature to
operate as her will." 12 The court pointed out that the paper offered "contained everything that she wished included in the paper she intended to
sign except the Christian names of her sister," Is and drew an analogy to
the hypothetical case of a testator signing a carbon copy ("a paper physically
different from that which she intended to sign") 14 instead of the original.
The court reasoned that, since it was the substance that mattered and not
the physical paper, "it appears unarguable that that document in carbon
would be invalid on that ground. The present will seems to us to differ
from such copy only in degree." 15 The will was admitted to probate with
the Christian name of the testatrix herself stricken where it appeared in
the body of the will on the grounds that "it is now well established that
words . . . introduced without the knowledge and approval of the
testator may be rejected and the remaining portion of the will alone admitted
to probate." 16 The New Zealand decision has been followed at least twice
17
by Canadian courts.
American courts faced with the problem of the instant case invariably
express discomfort at their inability to grant probate.' 8 Do the recent
Commonwealth cases offer a plausible solution to American courts? With
respect to admitting the wills to probate, the Commonwealth decisions
seem eminently practical. American rejection has been based, first, upon
the applicable statutory requirement of signature, and, second, upon purported consideration of the signer's want of testamentary intent. 19 But
when the unchallenged facts so clearly reveal the existence, nature, and
direction of that intent, both upon the face of the documents in question and
upon all available extrinsic evidence, possibility of fraud or of the court's
mistaking the intendment of the signer-fear of fraud or interpretative
error is the motivating force behind the statutes as well as behind the
common-law animus testandi requirement-is wholly negligible. To say
12. Id. at 623.

13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Id. at 624.
17. Re Brander, 6 West. Weekly R. (ns.) 702, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 688 (1952);

Re Duck, Vancouver Registry #51005/53

(Sup. Ct. B.C. 1953).

However, the

Canadian courts went further. In addition to striking the name of the testator from
the body of the will, they substituted the name of the manifestly intended legatee.
A critic, Gilbert D. Kennedy, has pointed out that the New Zealand will did not
require the insertion of a new name for the stricken one, and that the court there
had not so ordered, since what remained after striking sufficiently identified the
legatee. Mr. Kennedy contended that in the Canadian cases identification of legatees
was also possible, although admittedly more difficult, without the insertion of new
names. 31 CAN. B. REv. 185, 444 (1953).
18. "The facts are unusual and the result very unfortunate." Instant case at
565, 148 A.2d at 528; "This is a hard case . . . ." Alter's Appeal, 67 Pa. 341, 344
(1871) ; "I regret the blunder, but I cannot repair it." Nelson v. McDonald, 61 Hun.
406, 16 N.Y. Supp. 273, 278 (Sup. Ct. 1891).
19. See cases cited note 2 supra.
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under these circumstances that the testator did not sign the paper he
intended to be his will is an unnecessarily literal and unsophistocated construction of the probate requirements, as the New Zealand court so aptly
pointed out. The usual American statutory provision that "every will
•. shall be signed by the testator" 20 does not, it is submitted, preclude
accepting that court's reasoning. It is manifest that the testator in the
instant case signed a will-a will he considered to be his own and one
which was substantially identical to the one drawn for him.
More difficult for American jurisdictions to accept would be the
British method of construing such a will once admitted to probate. When
it is apparent that a single entire provision of a will has been included by
21
cases have
mistake or without the knowledge of the testator, the British
denied probate to that provision. American authority, though meager,
seems to indicate that similar procedure is available here.2 2 English law,
in addition, permits the probate court to omit individual words from
No American case permitting such
probate under similar circumstances.
action has been found. Therefore, under the facts of the instant case, an
English court of construction would be faced only with the problem of
finding meaning in a will which has some blank spaces, a far easier task than
that facing the American courts: finding meaning in a will which contains
obviously incorrect and logically impossible words. However, the latter
obstacle is not insurmountable. Upon construction the problem is not that
of reforming the instrument, but of dealing with ambiguities that arise from
its terms. 24 American courts have the power in resolving such uncertainties
to ignore words that are present in the instrument, imply the existence of
25
words that are not, and admit extrinsic evidence in the quest for clarity.
Admittedly, in the New Zealand case, construction was simpler than in
the instant one.26 Still the instant court could well have searched the four
corners of the will and, in conjunction with the will signed by the wife, have
found to a certainty the would-be testator's meaning. His -mistakes in
expression should not be allowed to override such clear intent. Thus the
will could have been given effect and need not have been a "meaningless
2
nullity."
But even if it did not wish to follow the lead of the British Commonwealth courts, an alternative course of action open to the Pennsylvania
court and which it had itself previously established, could have saved the
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.2 (1950).

21. ATKINsoN, WILLS § 58, at 275-77 (3d ed. 1953).
22. See O'Connell v. Dow, 182 Mass. 541, 66 N.E. 788 (1903); Sherwood v.
Sherwood, 45 Wis. 357. 362 (1878).
23. ATKINSON, Wnt.s § 58, 276-77 (3d ed. 1953).
24. See id. § 146, at 809-14.
25. AnaNsoN, WILLS § 146, at 812 (3d ed. 1953).
26. The New Zealand court had merely to interpret a bequest to sister X at a
given address as a gift to sister Y at the same address-not a difficult task when X's
name has been stricken at probate and Y is the only sister of the testator so residing.
27. Instant case at 567, 148 A.2d at 529.
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will. The two instruments, fliat signed by the wife and that signed by the
husband, could have been construed together to accomplish the testator's
purpose. In Kehr Will,28 testatrix wrote and initialed the three words
"null and void" at the top of an unexecuted carbon copy of her will, the
executed original of which was held by her attorney. 29 Finding that this
writing sufficiently complied with the formal requirement of the Wills
Act so that, had it been inscribed upon the face of the original will, it would
have been effective to revoke that instrument,30 the court then held that
its inscription upon the unexecuted carbon was equally effective for that
purpose. In so holding, the court necessarily construed the two documents
together; to have read the revocatory instrument alone would have led
the court to the conclusion that only the carbon, which was in any case
ineffective of itself, and not the original, was intended to be "null and void."
And, in Edelman Estate,31 a Pennsylvania orphans' court was faced with
two instruments found together in an envelope among testator's effects.
The first was a typed and formally executed will, in whose chief dispositive
clause the name of the original beneficiary, A, had been pencilled out and
the name of a new beneficiary, B, pencilled in. The second was a handwritten paper, also formally executed and declaring itself a last will and
testament, which made certain provisions not inconsistent with those of the
first will and, as to the chief dispositive clause, reproduced in terms the
language of that of the first will, but left blank the name of the beneficiary.
The court ruled that the obliterations and interlineations on the original
instrument, although sufficient to revoke the will as to A, were insufficient
to constitute an effective disposition to B ; 32 but it went on to treat the
second, handwritten paper as a codicil effective to republish the first document as modified, and ordered the probate of the two documents together.
Thus the second will, inoperative of itself for failure to name a beneficiary,
was saved by joint construction with the first. While, in both cases, each
of the instruments read together was separately formally executed, in
Edelman the first will had been effectively revoked independently of
the provisions of the second, and in Kehr, the second paper was made
operative, as a revocation, not because of but in spite of the effective
execution of the first. Analogously in the instant case, where the two
writings, although not identical copies of each other, were contentual
28. 373 Pa. 473, 95 A.2d 647 (1953), Hutton, Revocation of Wills in Pennsylvania, 58 Dicic. L. RFv. 25 (1953), 15 U. Pr. L. REv. 177 (1953).
29. The attorney had refused to deliver the executed will to testatrix until he
had been paid for his services. 373 Pa. at 476, 480, 95 A.2d at 648, 650.
30. PA. STAT. ANif. tit. 20, § 180.5 (1950), provides: "No will or codicil in
writing, or any part thereof, can be revoked or altered otherwise than: (1) Will
or codicil. By other will or codicil in writing. (2) Other writing. By some other
writing declaring the same, executed and proved in the manner required of wills, or
(3) Act to the document By being burnt, torn, canceled, obliterated, or destroyed
31. 84 Pa. D. & C. 16 (Lehigh County Orphans' Ct. 1953).
32. See note 30 supra.
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duplicates as to the residuary gift over to Martin, the court might have
read the two together. As Mr. Justice Musmanno, dissenting, suggests,33
the "eight corners" of the wills could then have been searched to find out
the testator's intent, which, under these circumstances, of course becomes
immediately perfectly clear. When it is unmistakable that formal failure of
expression is the result of an honest mistake, and, in spite of that mistake,
the intention of the testator remains entirely evident, the instant court's
professed fear of fraud 34 seems inappropriate, and those instruments
should be admitted to probate which will effectuate that evident intention.
33. Instant case at 574, 148 A.2d at 533 (dissent).
34. Id. at 571, 148 A2d at 531.

